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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
George Steven Swan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The following pages briefly review the status of political economy as
an interface of economics, of law, and of politics. Political economy
presents a field informing the study of institutions, and of norms, which
constitute the background to economic development. The rule of law
contributes to economic development. In great degree, investor confidence
is born under the shelter of law.
Engrossing is the saga of the People's Republic of China's long
march toward market-oriented prosperity between 1978 and 2008. That
march transpired in an atmosphere polluted by political tyranny. China's
breathtaking achievements between 1978-2008 in a one-party system
generate skepticism about the importance of the rule of law. Nevertheless,
the Chinese experiment to disprove the supposed need for a rule of law
remains inconclusive. In contrast, years-long, national booms in East Asia
sputtered in the face of financial crisis. These countries aimed for landing
on the shore of economically developed status never quite consummated.
A 2008 stock market crash in China affords a fine test of autocratic China's
capacity economically to thrive independently of the rule of law.
Measuring that supposed capacity is the test scheduled for 2009. Beijing's
ability to weather such a financial storm can be instructively compared, as
of 2010, with the experiences of her neighbors over the decade past.
II. WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY?
The term political economy can mark a sub-field of economics
(intersecting law, and politics). It can refer otherwise to the whole realm of
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economics (stretched to include intersection with law, and politics):
Political economy is the original name for economics, abandoned a
hundred years ago for the simpler term "economics" because the
content of the subject had narrowed. The word "economy" is derived
from a Greek word meaning "the management of the household."
Political economy would be the management of the nation. In the
nineteenth century, and frequently in the first half of the twentieth
century as well, what we now call economics and what we now call
political science would be studied under the heading of political
economy in the same department of the university. Over the last fifty
years or so, the unified departments split into individual departments of
economics and political science, as each subject acquired a separate
domain of investigation and a distinct style of analysis. The economy
came to be studied entirely on its own, as a great machine that reacts to
political decisions about such matters as tariffs and taxes but that runs
entirely in accordance with its own laws of motion.
Just as the divorce seemed completed, there emerged on the horizon
new problems that straddled the two disciplines. It became evident that
voting could be usefully analyzed by methods that have more in
common with economics than with political science as practiced at the
time. The study of voting became the domain of scholars who may
have started out as economists or as political scientists but who needed
familiarity with both disciplines. It became evident that economic
growth was as much a consequence of political organization as of
conditions in the economy. It became evident that society's choice of
laws could be explained on the same economic principles used to
explain society's choice of roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools. It
became evident that democratic government and civil liberties were
intimately connected with the organization of the economy.'
Economics represents a social science.2 It primarily focuses upon
problems where the solutions entail cooperation. The roles of institutions
and norms in economic development have been investigated.4 The history,
politics, and theory of the rule of law have been probed.5 Edmund Phelps
(recipient of the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2006)
opined: "Britain's property rights and rule of law enabled the rise of
1. DAN USHER, POLITICAL ECONOMY xv (2003).
2. MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 2 (2007). Milton Friedman was recipient of the Alfred
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Mark Gradstein & Kai
Konrad eds., 2007).
5. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004);
THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Barry R. Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008).
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commercial society.",6 Distinguishable from law is democracy.7  What are
the links among democracy, governance, and economic results?8
James M. Buchanan, recipient of the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economics in 1986, 9 explains that personal liberty is workable solely under
the rule of law.' 0  Buchanan envisions a state of nature wherein
concurrence on general rules for behavior might be expected to enrich
everyone's lot.'1  The requisite principle is one of generalization. 12  That
generality standard found institutional embodiment in a rule of law to
delineate widely agreed upon criteria toward evaluation of legal
structures. 13  This generality forestalls many alternatives from majority
option. 14 Yet, within the choice squaring with the criterion, majorities can
command. 15 Differential treatment under law on the grounds of Fender,
age, race, or religion is violative of the central normative principle. Law
6. Edmund Phelps, Innovative Thinkingfor European Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 17,
2007, at 13.
7. To avoid ethical premises, we define democratic government descriptively, i.e., by
enumerating certain characteristics which in practice distinguish this form of
government from others. A government is democratic if it exists in a society where
the following conditions prevail:
1. A single party (or coalition of parties) is chosen by popular election to run the
governing apparatus.
2. Such elections are held within periodic intervals, the duration of which cannot be
altered by the party in power acting alone.
3. All adults who are permanent residents of the society, are sane, and abide by the
laws of the land are eligible to vote in each such election.
4. Each voter may cast one and only one vote in each election.
5. Any party (or coalition) receiving the support of a majority of those voting is
entitled to take over the powers of government until the next election.
6. The losing parties in an election never try by force or any illegal means to
prevent the winning party (or parties) from taking office.
7. The party in power never attempts to restrict the political activities of any
citizens or other parties as long as they make no attempt to overthrow the
government by force.
8. There are two or more parties competing for control of the governing apparatus
in every election.
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1957) (footnote omitted).
8. See, e.g., YI FENG, DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2005).
9. GRAHAM BANNOCK, R.E. BAXTER, & EVAN DAVIS, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 39 (1998).
10. 18 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Criteria for a Free Society: Definition, Diagnosis, and Prescription,
in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, FEDERALISM, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 173, 173-74
(2001).
11. Id. at 175.
12. 11 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Preface, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN,
POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY xix (2001).
13. Id.
14. 19 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Society and Democracy, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
BUCHANAN, IDEAS, PERSONS, AND EVENTS 344, 351 (2001).
15. Id.
16. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Generality, Law, and Politics, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
BUCHANAN, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY,
supra note 12, at 3, 11.
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curbs overt departures from generality.' 7  Political discrimination cuts
along broad swathes instead of among separate persons. 18
Respectfully received was the 2006 study, A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History, by Douglass C. North, John
Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast.19 The issue in economic history is
how countries sustained economic growth in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.20 The key is the leap from a limited to an open access
society.21 Economic and political systems both tend to be of open, or else
of limited, access. In a limited access order, rents squeezed from those
exploited obtain because economic competition is occluded. Whereas in
.. 22open access societies, rents reward competition. Transition to an open
access order requires approximately fifty years.23 That suddenness marks
the missing middle between developed and non-developing societies.24
One finds no continuum.
25
Limited access polities are incapable of supporting economic open
access (inasmuch as political control over entry curbs economic
competition),26 and limited access economies are incapable of supporting
political open access (inasmuch as concentration of economic rents
empowers elites to curb political competition): "The origin of property
rights and legal systems is the definition of elite rights. How do open
access orders bar political winners from expropriating the losers? 28 Open
access societies are filled with organized groups. These organizations
provide focal points where government action can be evaluated and
contested.29
17. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Generality and the Political Agenda, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES BUCHANAN, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY
DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at 66, 67.
18. Id.
19. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, & Barry R. Weingast, A Conceptual Framework for
Interpreting Recorded Human History (Nat'l. Bur. of Econ. Research, Working Paper. No. 12795,
2006). Scholar of economic history, North was 1993 joint winner of the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economics. BANNOCK, ET AL., supra note 9, at 301.
20. North, et al., supra note 19, at 3.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 32, 34.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 39. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Daniel Walker Howe reminds Americans of the
indispensability of voluntary associations to civil society: "Evangelicals were the first Americans to set
up the voluntary associations we consider indispensable to civil society." Daniel Walker Howe,
Telegram From a Parallel Universe, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 2008, at 46, 47.
29. North, et al., supra note 19, at 42. Hence Point Nine of the recent demands by over 2,000
Chinese citizens in their daring manifesto, CHARTER 08:
Freedom to Form Groups. The right of citizens to form groups must be guaranteed.
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III. THE CHINESE ECONOMY EXPLODES: 1978-2008
Is there a politico-economic titan whose grand success evidences
development devoid of the rule of law? In 2009, everyone in the world is
alerted to the seemingly irresistible shift of global power to eastern Asia.3°
The planet's populace has been deeply impressed to see the exploding
Chinese economy in transition.3' And North, Wallis, and Weingast
propounded that the rule of law for elites is a doorstep condition of the
major step into development. Yet, inside China, trust and commitments
turn upon personal connections. They do not depend upon laws, contracts,
or other legal instruments.32 North, Wallis, and Weingast showcased the
The current system for registering non-government groups, which requires a group
to be "approved," should be replaced by a system in which a group simply registers
itself. The formation of political parties should be governed by the constitution and
the laws, which means that we must abolish the special privilege of one party to
monopolize power and must guarantee principles of free and fair competition
among political parties.
CHINA'S CHARTER 08, (2008), translated in N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 15, 2009, at 54, 55.
30. Harvard Business School Prof. Niall Ferguson reminds us that ours is "a time when the gap
between eastern and western incomes is narrowing at an unprecedented pace." Niall Ferguson, An
Ottoman Warning for America, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 2008, at 9. Prof. Ferguson is the author of
NIALL FERGUSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (2005) and NIALL FERGUSON, THE
WAR OF THE WORLD: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICT AND THE DESCENT OF THE WEST (2007).
31. See, e.g., BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH (2007);
THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ENTERPRISE AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (2007)
(Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke eds.). Other Asian nations accommodate themselves to China's
rise as a regional power. See, e.g., DAVID C. KANG, CHINA RISING: PEACE, POWER, AND ORDER IN
EAST ASIA (2007). According to the President of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Llewellyn H.
Rockwell, Jr.:
China's recovery from communism is one of the most inspiring stories in the
history of economic development. The country went from being a suffering and
impoverished land of catastrophe to being modernized in just 15 years. The state
shrunk in scope nearly by default as the private sector grew and grew. This wasn't
the plan. It was the de facto result of the new tolerance of free economic activity.
The state went into protective mode to keep its power, and did nothing to stop the
swell of private enterprise. The result was glorious.
Keep in mind this critical point: China's restoration as a civilized society came
about not due to some central plan, but by its absence. The fact that the state did
not intervene led to prosperity. Again, it wasn't a policy or a constitution or a law
that made the difference. There was no switch from a communist-style government
to a night-watchman state. Because the state abandoned its posts under public
opposition and contempt, society could flourish.
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., The Market Works in Recession, FREE MARKET, Dec. 2008, at 3.
32. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
170 (1996).
There is still the "old China" with the heavy hand of government, economic and
investment challenges (corruption, banks with bad loans, murky accounting
procedures and suspect numbers, lack of protection for intellectual property rights),
social problems (poverty, joblessness, intolerance for dissent and challenges to the
unilateral rule of the Communist Party), and major pollution problems.
Lewis J. Walker, No Illusion, the Rise of China, J. FIN. PLAN., Jan. 2006, at 32. Cannot China achieve
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significance of open access to organizations. Yet, while China gradually is
permitting nongovernmental organizations (e.g., advocacy groups and
charities), Beijing constricts their ambit. There has been, for example, no
legal framework to allow private charities. Parliament during 2006 shelved
a charities law draft bill.33  China's Communist Party is legally
untouchable. The 73-million strong Party dominates politics, and much
business activity. It is deeply entrenched in the (theoretically) separate
governmental administration. It stands above the law, with its own courts
and disciplinary processes.34
The twenty-first century has witnessed academic examination of, e.g.,
the new law and economic development,35 law and economics in
developing countries,36 and the economic analysis of law in China.37 The
notion that legal institutions prove crucial to the economic development
process stands widely accepted both on the campuses and in financial
the rule of law for elites? See, e.g., Bo ZHIYUE, CHINA'S ELITE POLITICS: POLITICAL TRANSITION AND
POWER BALANCING (2007).
33. Ian Johnson, In China, Grass-Roots Groups Stretch Limits on Activism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2008, at 1, A12.
Optimists point to some contrary indicators, such as outbreaks of environmental
activism - organized over the intemet or by mobile phone. It is true that the
network of social activities not directly controlled by the state has expanded, as the
Chinese economy has grown and become more complicated. This has created new
pressures to which the Communist party needs to respond. But the overall trend
seems to be towards less media freedom rather than more; and therefore less scope
for political expression and activism not approved by the party.
Gideon Rachman, Illiberal Capitalism: Russia and China Chart Their Own Course, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 9, 2008, at 9. "Despite opening up, China remains wary of religious groups." Dexter
Roberts, China's Spiritual Awakening, BUS. WK., Jan. 21, 2008, at 50.
34. Rosemary Righter, Book Review, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 1, 2008, at 22. Cf
DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION (2008).
Juridical scientists are familiar with North's limited access order in varied eras and locales commanding
a deployment of separate courts and disciplinary processes for elites. In the limited access order of
nineteenth-century Mexico (for example) the young Antonio Lrpez de Santa-Anna Prez accepted such
processes to be the natural state of affairs:
Despite growing convictions in Mexico that thefueros, the special privileges for the
clergy and military, should be ended, he continued to believe that the welfare of
Mexico depended upon continuance of special courts in which priests and army
officers were tried with little chance of being found guilty; in simplest terms, clerics
and military were above the civil law. These were the basic concepts on which he
had been reared and he swore never to abandon them.
JAMES A. MICHENER, THE EAGLE AND THE RAVEN 75-76 (1990).
35. THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). Cf MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, RULE OF LAW, REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT:
CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS (2008); LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Hans-Bemd
Schafer & Angara V. Raja eds., 2006).
36. EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM RATLIFF, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2000).
37. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN CHINA (2007) (Thomas Eger, Michael Faure & Zhang
Naigen eds.). Cf Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary
China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 125-52 (2000).
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institutions' research departments (such as that of the World Bank).38 Yet
fully a decade ago the People's Republic of China already seemed to have
accomplished the impossible: After all, the premise previously had been
that law must be antecedent to economy.39 Were proper laws not emplaced,
productive economic activity probably was not to transpire. 40  However,
recall the warning of North, Wallis, and Weingast that attaining
economically developed nation status is not incremental. It is not to be
won through marginal improvement in the rule of law, in expanded
schooling, or via increasing capital. How best is China's development
interpreted? 41  It elsewhere has been suggested that autocratic China's
42remains a trapped transition, encompassing problems which are an
integral part of the gradualist approach to reform, and not incidental
thereto.
The October 2007 report of the International Monetary Fund
disclosed that China's real GDP had grown 11.5 percent (year on year)
during 2007's first half. Chinese expansion throughout 2007 was 11.4
38. KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 5 (2006).
39. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 338
(1998). "China likes to refer to the [US-China] bilateral relationship as one between 'the world's
largest developing and developed countries', a self-serving formulation, as it implies a rich and
powerful US should accommodate a poorer China." Richard McGregor, A Relationship That Is Broad
But Too Shallow, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 2007, at 9.
40. Since 1978, China has recorded an electrifying annual growth rate of 9 percent for at least 19
times.
Japan's recovery (1950-90) following its devastation in World War II showed the
way for other Asian countries to rise. The four Asian Tigers followed. Deng
Xiaoping launched China's "open door" policy in December 1978, discarding
Soviet-style central planning in favor of a free-market approach. Since then China
has achieved a stunning 9 percent or higher yearly growth rate 19 times.
Lee Kuan Yew, Asia's Growing Role in Financial Markets, FORBES, Feb. 25, 2008, at 21.
41. See, e.g., INTERPRETING CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT (2007) (Wang Gungwu & John Wong eds.);
WANG HUI, CHINA'S NEW ORDER: SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMY IN TRANSITION (2006)
(Theordore Huters ed.) (Rebecca E. Karl trans.).
42. See, e.g., MINXIN PEI, CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL
AUTOCRACY (2006).
During the last two decades of the twentieth century the government policy of
"Reform and Opening" gave the Chinese people relief from the pervasive poverty
and totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and brought substantial increases in the
wealth and living standards of many Chinese as well as a partial restoration of
economic freedom and economic rights. Civil society began to grow, and popular
calls for more rights and more political freedom have grown apace. As the ruling
elite itself moved toward private ownership and the market economy, it began to
shift from an outright rejection of"rights" to a partial acknowledgment of them.
In 1998 the Chinese government signed two important international human rights
conventions; in 2004 it amended its constitution to include the phrase "respect and
protect human rights"; and this year, 2008, it has promised to promote a "national
human rights action plan." Unfortunately most of this political progress has
extended no further than the paper on which it is written....
CHINA'S CHARTER 08, supra note 29, at 54.
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percent. This thirteen year high marked the fifth year wherein output
exceeded a double-digit rate. It was up from 11.1 percent growth in 2006.
Economic growth peaked at 11.9 percent in the second quarter of 2007.
According to Beijing, it was 11.5 percent in the third quarter. It was
roughly 11.2 to 11.5 percent for the fourth quarter. Many analysts in late
2008 expected growth slowing to near 9 percent for 2008 and 7.9 percent
for 2009, a slip from 2007.43 China's growth path broadly has followed the
patterns of prior rapid expansions (e.g., those of Japan and Korea).
44
However, China had sustained strong growth for the lengthiest span.45
By 2007, China boasted 91 billionaires (in U.S. dollars). She had
43. Andrew Batson, China Cuts Rates as Crisis Hits Home, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at A6;
World Bank Cuts Forecast for China's Economic Growth, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2008, at A6 (thirteen-
year high); Richard McGregor, Chinese Likely to Ride Out Global Weakness, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008,
at 6 (five double-digit growth years); The Business Week, BUS. WK., Feb. 4, 2008, at 4 (11.5 percent
fourth quarter 2007; below 10 percent 2008); In Brief WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2008, at A6 (11.5 percent
third quarter 2007; 11.2 percent fourth quarter 2007; 11.1 percent 2006 and 11.4 percent 2007); Andrew
Batson, China Sharpens Its Attention on Domestic Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2008, at A14 (11.9
percent second quarter 2007 and 11.5 percent third quarter 2007). Yu Yong-ding directs China's
Institute of World Economics and Politics: "Yu believes China's growth rate will fall in 2008 to 9 or 10
percent, 'and I'm very conservative."' Daniel Gross, The U.S. Economy Faces the Guillotine,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 2008, at 39, 41. "Standard Chartered Bank's forecast calls for growth of 7.9
percent next year." Patrick Barta, Sharp Downturn in Asia Nears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at A9.
44. The World Bank has just lowered its forecast for China in light of the deteriorating U.S.
economy. It now expects growth for all of 2008 to slow to 9.4 percent, down two full percentage points
from 2007. That still is extremely fast by the standards of any other economy, but it would be an
adjustment for China after five straight years of 10 percent or more growth. Andrew Batson, Finally,
Slower Growth for China?, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2008, at A6. In 2008, some speculated that the
Chinese expansion was functioning at the safety limit of capacity. Samuel Brittan, High Time for All of
Us to 'Buck Up', FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at 11. At least in an American-style developed economy, the
growth ceiling of a majority of enterprises is 12 percent annually. Ame Alsin, Heed History's Lessons
and the Gap Between Price and Value, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2/3, 2008, at 4.
45. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 179, 180, Figure 5.8
(October 2007). So-called spontaneous land reform was implemented (supposedly) in secret by a knot
of peasants in the minuscule village of Xiaogang (in China's eastern Anhui Provence) during December
1978:
At that time the country was still recovering from the chaos of the cultural
revolution. Most arable land was collectivized into communes, a system that had
helped push much of the country to the brink of starvation. According to
Communist party legend, after consulting the village elders on how they could
avoid starvation, 18 hungry peasant farmers in Xiaogang signed a secret pact
dividing their commune's land between them for each household to farm
individually, a unilateral action that could easily have led to them all being executed
as traitors.
Instead, their example was championed by senior reform-minded officials,
including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who ordered the "household
responsibility system" be rolled out across the countryside. Peasant households
were given 30-year contracts to use their land to grow what they wished and to keep
or sell any surplus they produced. Capitalism had returned and the Chinese
economic miracle had begun.
Jamil Anderlini, Losing the Countryside: A Restive Peasantry Calls on Beijing for Land Rights, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 20, 2008, at 17.
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encompassed 345,000 persons owning minimum financial assets of $1
million during 2006. That was an increase of 7.8 percent from 2005.46
Sustained economic development has conjured a class called Xin Gui (New
Nobility).47
In November 2007, PetroChina became the globe's most valuable
company.48  The world's largest airline, bank, insurer and telecom
company-as well as the world's biggest oil company-was then Chinese.
During 2007 alone, China built new electrical generating capacity
exceeding the entire capacity of the United Kingdom's grid.4 In 2007,
China outpaced South Africa to become the earth's biggest producer of
gold ore. 0 Already was China the planet's foremost producer of
aluminum, lead, and zinc. China was the second largest tin producer, and
she ranked among the top ten producers of silver, nickel, and copper.5'
China is the planet's third largest trading entity. Her gross
merchandise exports more than quintupled between the beginning of this
century and August 2007. China is the world's second biggest exporter of
goods (behind Germany, but leading the U.S.).5" So swollen were Chinese
trade surpluses that in 2007 the current account was to register a $400
billion surplus. That equaled approximately 12 percent of Gross Domestic
Product. That was up from $21 billion--or 1.7 percent of Gross Domestic
46. In China, an income of $25,000 pays for an affluent lifestyle with a nice automobile or regular
golf outings.
47. James T. Areddy, Robb Report Delivers Luxury to China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2008, at B3.
48. Gideon Rachman, Five Events That Have Defined 2007, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 2007,
at 11. It overtook ExxonMobil as the top company in the world by market value. Victor Mallet, The
Rise of Asia Is a Global Good, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 28, 2007, at 9. Concededly, Petro China's
share price grew 181 percent in 2007, to surpass ExxonMobil as the biggest energy company by market
capitalization. ExxonMobil's share price grew just 22 percent over 2007. But Exxon remains the
biggest listed group in oil production terms. And Petro China is worth the less when the value of its
Hong Kong (not Shanghai) shares is extrapolated into market capitalization. Sheila McNulty, China
and Brazil Continue Rise to Overtake Oil Multinationals, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 23, 2008, at 18.
49. Mallet, supra note 48, at 9.
50. Since 1905 had South Africa been ensconced as number one gold producer.
51. Javier Blas & Alec Russell, China Tops Gold Mining List to End South Africa's Century Reign,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2008, at 1. Perhaps less affirmatively, China is the planet's biggest
consumer of metals. By 2006 it consumed 32 percent of the globe's steel; 23 percent of its copper; 18
percent of its nickel; and 30 percent of its zinc. Between 2000 and 2006 it accounted for 31 percent of
world incremental oil demand (vs. under 20 percent for all North America). China is the world's largest
emitter of carbon dioxide. Martin Wolf, China Changes the Whole World, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
23, 2008, at 2. "The world's biggest consumer and producer of coal, China relies on coal for 78 percent
of its electricity." Shai Oster & David Winning, China Aims to Curb Power Shortages, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 24, 2008, at A8. "China, the world's biggest consumer of coal, is the second-biggest consumer of
oil, after the U.S., gobbling up nearly eight million barrels a day, nearly a quarter of OPEC's daily
output. Its demand for oil has increased about 38 percent since 2003." Mark Gongloff, China 's Impact
on Oil Prices: Not Much, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at C1. China accounts for 50 percent of the
yearly global increase in oil consumption. Keith Bradsher, Trucks Propel China's Economy, and Foul
Its Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at 1.
52. Wolf, supra note 51, at 2.
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Product-in 2000. 53 In fact, in 2008 the aggregate current account surplus
of emerging markets entirely concentrated in the oil exporting countries
and China. As a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, the 2007 Chinese
current account surplus totaled treble the Japanese level of the 1980s.55 It
was over double the largest such surplus Japan ever generated. China's
2008 current account surplus was predicted to equal those of Japan and
Germany combined. 6
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics price index of America's imports
from China steadily slipped from the end of 2003 (when the U.S.
government began calculating the series) until February 2007. It hopped
2.4 percent between that February and November 2007. Then Chinese
businesses enjoyed so potent a demand that they could command higher
prices and still keep assembly lines humming.57 Anyway, China no longer
depends upon exports to the United States.
Much of China's growth derives from exporting elsewhere 58 (China's
foremost trading partner is Europe59), and from internal investment in
infrastructure6 ° (China grows thanks to investment).61 In 2008, Beijing
anticipated a backlash once China's foreign exchange reserves touched
$1.5 trillion.62 This would be treble that level of late 2004.63 For the first
53. Robert J. Samuelson, Mercantilism Is Making a Comeback, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 26,
2007, at A11. Of course, most good things must come to an end. Dexter Roberts, China's Factory
Blues: The Days of Ultra-Cheap Labor and Little Regulation Are Gone. As Manufacturers' Costs
Climb, Export Prices Will Follow, BUS.WK., April 7, 2008, at 78.
54. Edward Chancellor, Mounting Risks for Emerging Markets, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 4, 2008,
at 9.
55. Samuelson, supra note 53, at A 1l.
56. Wolf, supra note 51, at 2.
57. Keith Bradsher, China Lets Currency Appreciate a Bit Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at
BI, B4.
58. John Authers, Caught Between the Twin Poles of Fear and Hope, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
29/30, 2007, at 12.
59. James T. Areddy, Yuan's Surge Unlikely to Halt U.S. Criticism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2007, at
CI. In 2007, the European Union succeeded the United States as China's biggest export market. Sales
to the expanded European Union rose 29.2 percent during 2007, compared to only 14 percent to the
U.S. Richard McGregor & Krishna Guha, China 's Trade Surplus Growth Set to Slow, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 12/13, 2008, at 2.
60. Authers, supra note 58, at 12. "Emerging markets growth hinges in large part on building
infrastructure for internal growth, and is not merely about exports." John Authers, A Good Moment for
Bargains?, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 23, 2008, at 3 (The World in 2008). "A boom in construction of
housing, infrastructure and new factories has been a major driving force of China's expansion in recent
years." Andrew Batson, China Sharpens Its Attention on Domestic Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
2008, at A14. "Most investment funding comes from retained earnings. In 2007, these self-generated
funds accounted for almost 60 percent of China's fixed asset investments." Jing Ulrich, How Dividend
Income Could Boost China's Social Welfare, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2008, at 26. "According to
the Royal Bank of Scotland, about 60 percent of fixed-asset investment in China is financed by self-
generated funds." The Lex Column, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2008, at 14.
61. See, e.g., JAMES RIEDEL, JING JIN, & JIAN GAO, How CHINA GROWS: INVESTMENT, FINANCE,
AND REFORM (2007).
62. In October 2007 China's foreign exchange reserves were $1.455 billion. Wolf, supra note 51,
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time was China spending more money purchasing overseas companies-
such purchases including stakes in Wall Street titans Bear Steams (now
deceased)64 and Morgan Stanley65-than was spent on takeovers of Chinese
66 TeCicompanies. The China Investment Corporation was established in 2007
to goose returns on Beijing's fattening foreign exchange reserves. 67  In
2008, that Corporation held $200 billion in funds. Perhaps $80 billion
thereof was for investment externally.68 The yuan closed 2007 up 6.9
percent against the dollar.69 And on November 30, 2008, China, holding
at 2. China's reserves today are over $500 billion greater than Japan's. Id.
If gold and foreign currency reserves were the only prerequisite for harboring
global ambitions in the monetary arena, China would make impressive claims of its
own with $1.7 trillion as of December 2007, the world's highest level. Japan comes
in second at $973 billion. If you add together the gold and foreign currency
reserves of EU member states that have adopted the euro, including those of the
European Central Bank, the total amount in the EU is $511 billion.
Judy Shelton, Security and the Falling Dollar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at A15.
63. Areddy, supra note 59, at C2.
64. Ben White, Cayne Apologizes as Bear Stearns Vanishes Into Wall Street History, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 30, 2008, at 1; Kate Kelly, Mike Spector, & Randall Smith, Bear's Final Moment: An
Apology and No Lack ofIre, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2008, at C 1.
65. "China's new sovereign wealth fund recently bought a $5 bn (2.5 bn, €3.4 bn) stake in
Morgan Stanley, an investment bank and one of the biggest names on Wall Street." Rachman, supra
note 48, at 9. The China Investment Corporation made waves via the investment of $3 billion in the
U.S. buyout firm Blackstone shortly prior to its flotation. Peter Thai Larsen & Chris Hughes, Sovereign
Wealth Funds: The New Kids on the Block, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 24, 2008, at 1.
66. Areddy, supra note 59, at C2. ".... Morgan Stanley convinced China Investment Corp. to
invest about $5 billion; and Merrill Lynch received $12.8 billion in two rounds." Rob Cox, New
Dealer, Same Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at C14. The Chinese Investment Corporation pocketed
a 9.9 percent stake in Morgan Stanley. Andrew Wood, Asia Is Opening Up and Welcoming External
Help, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 2008, at 8.
67. George Parker, Brown Urges Chinese Fund to Use London, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 19/20,
2008, at 5.
Virtually every investment company in the world is trying to enter the Chinese
market at the moment-there are currently around 60 fund companies approved by
the regulators, half of which are joint ventures involving foreign groups such as JP
Morgan, Deutsche Bank and Invesco. The industry has seen an explosion in assets
under management from 40bn in 2005 to around $450bn by the end of 2007, the
result of rising share prices and massive inflows of retail money.
Geoff Dyer, Chinese Job Market Raises the Stakes, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 26, 2008, at 4.
68. Henry Sender, China Turns Risk Averse, Even as Capital Outflows Rise, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 18, 2008, at 21. And the China Banking Regulatory Commission announced that domestic banks
may invest client funds into the Japanese stock market. So may they invest in mutual funds, should
they obtain permission from the Japanese regulator. This expanded China's Qualified Domestic
Institutional Investor program, allowing investments in overseas investment products. (In December
2007 had that program's permitted investment area stretched beyond Hong Kong to encompass the
U.K. stock market.) Juan Chen, China to Allow Investments in Japan Stocks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23/24,
2008, at B6. China is the earth's largest capital exporter. Wolf, supra note 51, at 2.
69. James T. Areddy, China's Slower Profit Train Could Derail a Stock Boom, WALL ST. J., Jan.
3, 2008, at CI, C2. "The renminibi, which has risen by about 13 percent against the US dollar since
mid-2005, has been rising more rapidly recently, increasing at an annualized rate of about 19 percent in
January." Richard McGregor, Chinese Inflation Set to Hit 11-year High, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19,
2008, at 3.
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$682 billion in Treasury notes, bills and bonds, proved the major holder of
America's public debt.
7 °
A number of China's largest banks (including Bank of
Communications and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) declared
that their earnings increased 60 percent in 2007 (year over year). Analysts
said that net profits in that industry waxed correspondingly. Domestic
media guesstimates put pretax profits for all banks at $85.4 billion. This
marked an 83 percent increase from the year previous.
The China case 72-- one of steroidal economic growth over the three
decades 1978-2008--continues pointedly to challenge understanding in
2009 of the law-development nexus. Question: Does this precedent
squarely disprove the proposition that the rule of law must precede
development? 73 Answer: Alternatively, the Chinese development spurt (to
what remains an absolutely modest level74) might suffice to beget the
resources (and public constituency) supportive of additional growth into a
genuinely developed country status.75 For key to the issue is that China
now lies at a far lower level of per capita Gross Domestic Product than,
e.g., Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
76
70. George Melloan, Why 'Stimulus' Will Mean Inflation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A13; The
Lex Column, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 2008, at 14.
Chinese officials may privately complain about the US government's profligacy,
but they also recognize that being one of the largest holders of Treasury bonds does
not bring as much leverage as might appear at first sight. China has little choice but
to keep buying more US securities because a collapse in bond prices and the dollar
would also have a huge impact on China's dollar holdings and its own economy - a
situation Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury Secretary, called "the financial
balance of terror."
Geoff Dyer, Beijing Hesitates at the Global Threshold, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 24, 2008, at 3.
71. Jamil Anderlini, Bumper Year for China's Lenders, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2008, at 19.
72. See, e.g., JOHN GITrINGS, THE CHANGING FACE OF CHINA: FROM MAO TO MARKET (2005).
73. DAM, supra note 38, at 231.
74. Define middle income as a family with at least $26,000 a year in the U.S. or $5,000 in China.
By that definition 80 percent of Americans are in the middle or upper classes, but only 8 percent of
Chinese and 5 percent of Indians. A. Gary Shilling, Chinese Chance, FORBES, May 19, 2008, at 150;
A. Gary Schilling, Sell Commodities, FORBES, Mar. 10, 2008, at 110.
Drive the highway from Shanghai to Suzhou, and the entire distance takes you
through one developing industrial district after another-new, modem facilities,
with high-rise apartment villages for employees, families, and young people who
consider a 900-square foot, two-bedroom apartment (one room for the "one child")
the lap of luxury.
Walker, supra note 31, at 34. "The most affluent and fastest growing areas of China are mostly the
closest to the sea and you need drive only a short distance from Beijing and Shanghai to experience a
different world." John Kay, Emerging Economies Have Not Become 'Decoupled', FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 21, 2007, at 13. China's rural poor, excluded from the China boom, endure inequality
and injustice. See, e.g., CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, WILL THE BOAT SINK THE WATER? (2006)
(study of Anhui Province).
75. DAM, supra note 38, at 232.
76. Id. at 239.
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IV. THE CHINESE ECONOMY IMPLODES: DECEMBER 17, 2007
Prior to December 2007, it had been doubted that China's economy
lived up to its reputation.77 Sure enough, on December 17 the World Bank
released fresh data relating to the global economy's production of goods
and services. Its 2005 International Comparison Program estimated
Purchasing Power Parities ("PPPs") benchmarked to 2005.78 For China
and India, less reliable previous estimation methods had engendered their
estimated GDPs at a level 40 percent larger than were the new and
improved techniques of 2007.79 The University of Glasgow's Adam Smith
Professor of Political Economy Ronald MacDonald advises that it now is
accepted widely by such institutions as the International Monetary Fund (as
well as the World Bank) that in cross-country GDP-level comparisons
market exchange rates ought to be avoided since these can be diverted from
equilibrium-or fair-values for protracted intervals. PPP rates valuing
GDPs in common prices should be utilized. Numerous studies signal that
PPP rates elicit the more satisfactory cross-country GDP comparisons.80 A
variety of elements can impact equilibrium currency prices:
A factor that may affect equilibrium currency prices is the interest rate
of a country. If the U.S. interest rate, corrected for people's
expectations of inflation, abruptly increased relative to interest rates in
the rest of the world, international investors elsewhere would increase
their demand for dollar-denominated assets, thereby increasing the
demand for dollars in foreign-exchange markets. An increased demand
in foreign-exchange markets, other things held constant, would cause
the dollar to appreciate and other currencies to depreciate.
Another factor affecting equilibrium is a change in relative
productivity. If one country's productivity increased relative to
another's, the former country would become more competitive in world
markets. The demand for its exports would increase, and so would the
demand for its currency. Changes in consumers' tastes also affect the
equilibrium prices of currencies. If Japan's citizens suddenly
developed a taste for a U.S. product, such as video games, this would
increase the demand for U.S. dollars in foreign-exchange markets.
Finally, economic and political stability affect the supply of and
demand for a currency, and therefore the equilibrium price of that
77. Bryan Caplan, Asian Development Bank Says I'm Right About China, LIBR. ECON. LIBERTY,
Nov. 15, 2007, http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2007/l 1/asian developme.html.
78. Press Release, World Bank, 2005 International Comparison Program Preliminary Global
Report Compares Size of Economies (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.worldbank.org (search for 2005
International Comparison Program Preliminary Global Report Compares Size of Economies).
79. Id. at 1-2.
80. Ronald MacDonald, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2008, at 10.
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currency. If the United States looked economically and politically
more stable than other countries, more foreigners would want to put
their savings into U.S. assets than in assets of another country. This
would increase the demand for dollars.
81
PPP, instead of market exchange rates, is the preferable metric of the
relative cost of living, because the former is premised upon goods and
82services which households can purchase with their domestic currency.
For example, 2008 opened with the American dollar well beneath its PPP
(as metric of the greenback's purchasing power).83  Should one care
concerning a country's position in the world economy, then exchange rate
measures are the tool of choice. China's economy might have expanded at
approximately 11 percent during 2007 in terms of yuan, but its growth in
U.S. dollars exceeded 17 percent. That dollar growth rate is the rate
relevant to China's ascent in the global economic hierarchy.84 Yet to have
a feel for living standards, PPP (cautiously utilized) can prove a helpful
device.
85
This 2007 recalculation affected China particularly, because it marked
the initial instance wherein China stringently had been surveyed for price
data.86 These new estimates imply that there languish hundreds of millions
more Chinese (than previously supposed) subsisting at the World Bank's
poverty line of one dollar per diem. The absolute total of persons living
beneath this poverty line in 2008 approximates 300 million. That figure is
treble the pre-December 2007 estimate.18 China's toilers endure even more
81. Barry L. Reece, Currency Exchange, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINE$$ AND FINANCE 221,
223 (Burton S. Kaliski ed. in chief, 2001).
82. Estimates Shrink Chinese Economy, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 19, 2007, at 2.
83. According to the Wharton School's famed Prof. Jeremy Siegel, My Forecast for 2008,
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN, Feb. 2008, at 42. The U.S. dollar's weakness against such currencies as the
U.K. pound can evoke such statistical illusions as a British per capita economic muscle eclipsing the
American per capita economic brawn:
Chalk one up for Queen and country. For the first time since 1885, Britain's
standard of living, measured by per capita gross domestic product, is poised to
overtake that of the U.S. British GDP per head will hit $46,088 this year, compared
with $45,598 in America, predicts Adrian Cooper, managing director of financial
consultants Oxford Economics. Thank the pound's strength against the dollar for
about 75 percent of Britain's advance, Cooper says.
Mark Scott, Britain Lives It Up, BUS.WK., Jan. 28, 2008, at 17.
84. Bill Wilby, The Dollar and the Market Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at A25.
85. Stephen Sestanovich, Russia by the Numbers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2007, at A21.
86. The report revealed that it did not believe this estimate of Chinese GDP to be more than five
percent off-base. Bob Davis, World Bank Offers New Take on GDP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at
Al0.
87. Scheherazade Daneshkhu, China, India Economies '40% smaller', Dec. 18, 2007, at t
(http://www.ft.com/cms/2/0/36a2d566-ad82-1 ldc-9386-0000779fd2ac,dwp-uuid--9c 3370...).
88. Albert Keidel, The Limits of a Smaller, Poorer China, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2007, at
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impoverishment and despair than many spectators had comprehended.89
Rampant corruption ensuing upon burgeoning growth, in combination with
tension between the rural poor and the urban wealthy, is producing terrific
stress.90
The International Comparison Program ("ICP") constitutes a global
statistical initiative to amass comparative price data, and to estimate the
PPPs of the planet's foremost economies. Utilizing PPPs (rather than
market exchange rates to convert currencies) renders it possible to compare
the outputs of economies-and the welfare of their respective
participants-in real time (i.e., controlling for real price-level
differences). 91 The 2005 ICP elicited estimates of the relative price-levels
of GDP and its principal aggregates for 146 economies. These PPPs
express the value of local currencies in terms of a common currency (the
US dollar).92 The 2005 ICP represents the most thorough, and extensive,
endeavor ever to measure PPP across countries.93
In these new tabulations, the US remained the world's biggest
economy with 23 percent of global GDP, trailed by China with 10 percent
(and then by Japan with 7 percent).94 Invoking the PPP metric produces a
world GDP lar er than GDP converted to US dollars keyed to market
exchange rates. Many lands-including China-were for their first time
included in 2005:96
The power and energy on display in emerging Chinese cities can be so
impressive it is easy to forget that China's per capita output is less than
Albania's. In purchasing power parity terms, at $5,325, China comes
in 100th place, four slots behind Albania. Of course China, with its
1.3bn people, has an economy vastly bigger-roughly 350 times
89. According to President and Chief Economist Charles W. McMillion of MBG Information
Services in Washington. Charles W. McMillion, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 19,
2007, at 12.
90. See, e.g., GutDI & CHUNTAO, supra note 74. To be sure, a challenge presented in estimating
poverty resides, ultimately, in the failure to identify an international poverty level-or even a national
poverty line-corresponding to the genuine cost of attaining fundamental human requirements.
According to Sanjay G. Reddy, of the Barnard College Economics Department and the Columbia U.
School of International and Public Affairs. Sanjay G. Reddy, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 19, 2007, at 12.
91. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD BANK, 2005
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON PROGRAM PRELIMINARY RESULTS DECEMBER 2007, 9 (2007).
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 14. Diverse are the estimates of the size of the global capital market. The average
emerging from figures compiled by Goldman Sachs, by Merrill Lynch & Co., and by the McKinsey
Global Institute place the total stock of world equities at approximately $33 billion. George Hoguet,
Sovereign Funds Should Lend Support to Equities, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 13, 2007, at 26.
96. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 91, at 11.
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bigger, in fact-than its east European cousin. Scale does matter. But,
until China chooses to act like the sum of its parts, it might be more
useful to think of it as 350 Albanias than as one America.
97
Prior estimates of China's PPPs had resulted from a 1986 research
study.98  China submitted prices for eleven administrative areas (plus the
urban and rural components). 99 These eleven city prices were extrapolated
to the national level by the Asian Development Bank, and by the World
Bank. 100
What does the Chinese GDP level signify, more broadly?
V. THE CHINA SYNDROME
When their own per capita GDP levels lay at the contemporary
Chinese level, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (plus several additional
neighbors of China) grew at least as quickly as has the People's
Republic. 10 1 True, China's per capita GDP (at purchasing power parit
swelled by 370 percent between 1978 and 2004, a 6.1 percent trend rate.
However, between 1950 and 1973 the per capita GDP of Japan waxed by
460 percent, an 8.2 percent trend rate.' Between 1962 and 1990 the per
97. David Pilling, How China Can Be More Than 350 Albanias, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 20,
2008, at 9.
98. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 91, at 11.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id.
101. DAM, supra note 38, at 239; BILL EMMOTT, RISE AND COLLIDE (2008). For that matter,
Vietnam in the early 1990s eschewed Communist economic planning. Its economy has expanded an
average of 7.5 percent annually since 2000. It expanded 8.5 percent during 2007, and Hanoi anticipated
equal growth for 2008. James Hookway, Vietnam 's Hottest Market Is Real Estate, Not Stocks, Wall ST.
J., Jan. 30, 2008, at Bl, BI0. Communism was imposed upon the Vietnamese later than upon the
mainland Chinese. Hence Vietnam's private sector contributes a larger function in her economy than
that sector had played in China when Deng Xiaoping first instigated economic reforms. Sarah Murray,
The Ho Chi Minh Trail to an MBA, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 2008, at 9.
102. DAM, supra note 38, at 239 (citing Martin Wolf, China Has Further to Grow to Catch Up with
the World, FIN. TIMES (London), April 13, 2005). The Chinese Communist Party in 1978, under Deng
Xiaoping's new captaincy, announced that its focus would shift to economic development. Id. at 240.
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping had
only to look at the growing economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong to recognize the inherent flaws in the centrally planned socialist model versus
western capitalist models. In that sense, "modem China" dates to 1978 as Deng
Xiaoping moved the People's Republic into a new era of market-based growth,
more "sink or swim" incentives for workers and producers, and growing national
assertiveness and pride.
Walker, supra note 31, at 32. A common sight in Chinese cities is Deng Xiaoping's catchphrase:
"Development is the only rationale." Pankaj Mishra, The Quiet Heroes of Tibet, N.Y. REV. BKS., Jan.
17, 2008, at 39.
103. DAM, supra note 38, at 239 (citing Martin Wolf, China Has Further to Grow to Catch Up with
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capita GDP of South Korea skyrocketed by 680 percent, a trend rate of 7.6
percent. 0 4  And between 1958 and 1987 the per capita GDP of Taiwan
mounted by 680 percent, a trend rate of 7.1 percent. °5 These stretches of
boomtimes ranging from 23 years (Japan) to 29 years (Taiwan) compare to
the Chinese history of 1978 to date."
Also, between 1990 and 1996 Thailand grew at rates ranging from 6.8
percent to 11.2 percent. 10 7  Malaysia between 1990-1996 expanded
economically at rates ranging from 8.9 to 10.0 percent. Indonesia between
1990-1996 grew at rates ranging from 7.2 to 9.0 percent. Unfortunately,
after these muscular surges, between 2000 and 2004 Thailand managed an
average growth rate of 5.4 percent; Malaysia eked out an average growth
rate of 4.4 percent; and Indonesia squeezed out an average growth rate of
4.6 percent.1 8 As a national economy earns a per capita GDP level nearer
that in the developed world, the prospects for a catch-up with first world
business methods and technology become more expensive'0 9 and
the World, FIN. TIMES (London), April 13, 2005). The Korean War opened on Japan's doorstep, under
American occupation, in 1950. America's Vietnam War concluded in 1973.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 239-40. According to Amartya Sen, recipient of the Alfred Nobel Prize in Economics in
1998, and Jean Dreie:
The lessons of successful growth-mediated progress in east Asia include the
importance of various areas of state action, including basic education, general-
particularly preventive-health care, and land reform. In understanding and
interpreting the 'economic miracle' in east Asia, these roles of public action have to
be viewed along with the part played by governments in directly promoting
industrial expansion and export orientation and in guiding the patterns of
industrialization.
AMARTYA SEN & JEAN DREE, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity 42, in THE
AMARTYA SEN AND JEAN DREZE OMNIBUS (2006).
107. DAM, supra note 38, at 240.
108. Id. For that matter, the Republic of Ireland (the Celtic Tiger)enjoyed 15 years of
seven percent annual economic growth. Between 1970 and 2000 it experienced a 2,000 percent
expansion in exports, and personal disposable income therein doubled over the decade past. See, e.g.,
R. F. FOSTER, LUCK AND THE IRISH (2008). Of course, most good things must come to an end. Charles
Forelle, Ireland's Boom Falls Hard in Global Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7/8, 2009, at A6; John Murray
Brown, Tough Choices Await If the Celtic Tiger Is to Roar Once More, FIN. TIMES (London), May 6,
2008, at 9; Kerry Capell, Ireland: The End of the Miracle, BUS. WK., April 7, 2008, at 40. "Ireland is
entering a depression... " Wolfgang Mtinchau, Our Lethargic Leaders Need to Start Working
Together, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 7.
109. On the other hand, alternative analyses differ with the comprehension of Kenneth C. Dam
shared in the text. Bart van Ark, Executive Director of the Conference Board (the international
business organization) last year still supposed China's accelerating productivity growth to be
sustainable:
... many emerging economies now seem able to sustain much faster increases in
economic efficiency as they catch up with their richer counterparts. China's
productivity growth rate has been accelerating to over 10 percent in 2007,
something Prof van Ark thinks is now more sustainable because there is increasing
evidence of innovation and the movement of people from agrarian living to
industrial working.
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difficult."
The predicament of South Korea today illuminates the difficulties that
even a rapidly developing nation confronts in bidding to complete its
mutation into a fully developed economy."' Its years-long economic surge
rendered her the planet's number eleven economy-a top exporter of cars,
electronics, ships, and steel. Her robust growth over 2002-2007 kept at a
pace of approximately 4.5 percent per annum. 112  However, this paled
beside the 6 to 7 percent growth rate of the prior half-decade, and the still-
headier figures of earlier decades. In 2006, South Korea slipped behind
both Brazil and India, demoting her to the thirteenth rank." 3 By 2008, the
verdict in the international business media was that South Korea might
continue to expand economically at a pace faster than those of many
western countries (or of her longtime rival, Japan). Yet Seoul's halcyon
days of eleven percent annual growth were long gone. 14  Whereas the
recent expansion of South Korea-anticipated at approximately 4 percent
for 2008-is excellent by most rich nations' standards, it is only 50 percent
of the average pace of the 1970s and 1980s.
1 5
In the third quarter of 2008, South Korea slipped into debtor-nation
status for its initial time in over eight years. Then, preliminary data
signified that her industrial output had shrunk 2.4 percent from October
2007 to October 2008. This was the first such annual contraction for South
Korea in 13 months."l 6 South Korea's exports were down 18.3 percent in
Chris Giles, Living Standards Set to Suffer Strain, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 15, 2008, at 2.
110. DAM, supra note 38, at 239. And the reverse is true as well. Columbia U. Prof. Stephen
Sestanovich grasps of the Russian economy's extraordinary expansion: "The low base from which it is
growing means that strong increases can continue for a long time before petering out." Sestanovich,
supra note 85, at A21.
111. Evan Ramstad, Candidate Rallies Koreans Behind a Grandiose Project, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2007, at Al.
112. Id. at A17.
113. Id. at Al. Cambridge University economist Ha-joon Chang avers that his native South Korea
prospered through going contrary to many economic prescriptions demanded by rich countries (as
through the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization) as conditions
for aid (e.g., largescale and swift trade liberalization). See, e.g., HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS:
THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM (2007). Somewhat by contrast,
meanwhile, the People's Republic of China had cooperated with international institutions, even if
detrimentally to its own interests. See, e.g., ALASTAIR IAN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2008). In all events, the rise of global financial markets (premised
upon the minimally-constrained international flow of capital) derives from an old economic orthodoxy
only reembraced widely circa 1994. See, e.g., RAWi ABDEAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION
OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007).
114. Andrew Wood, Why the Financial World Still Has Frontiers to Cross, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 5/6, 2008, at 12.
115. Sebastian Moffett & Sungha Park, South Korea Looks to Put Pep Back into Economy, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 26, 2008, at A6.
116. Evan Ramstad, South Korea's High Household Debt Adds Financial Woes, WALL ST. J., Nov.
29/30, 2008, at A5.
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November 2008 from a year earlier. This transpired notwithstanding the
Korean won's staggering devaluation (shedding some 25 percent of its
value against the dollar and the Chinese yuan, and 46 percent against the
Japanese yen).1 17  Small wonder was it that the recipient of the Alfred
Nobel Memorial Prize in 2008 for his analysis of trade patterns and
location of economic activity, Paul Krugman, then announced that South
Korea must have been undergoing a nightmare: The Asian financial crisis
of the 1990s once more."
8
The region in question herein indeed was impacted by that 1997-1998
Asian financial crisis. Inferior macroeconomic management might have
ignited that Asian financial crisis. 19 Nevertheless, the extent of stock
market declines and of exchange rate depreciation among the crisis lands
related snugly with their respective debilities in legal institutions respecting
corporate governance (notably, regarding the dearth of any protection of
minority shareholders). 120  Familiar, of course, to scholars of law and
economics is the prominent issue of corporate governance 12 1 in context of
the 1998 East Asia/Russia/Brazil crisis:
The East Asia crisis has highlighted the flimsy protections investors in
emerging markets have and put the spotlight on the weak corporate
governance practices in these markets. The crisis has also led to a
reassessment of the Asian model of industrial organization and finance
around highly centralized and hierarchical industrial groups controlled
by management and large investors. There has been a similar
reassessment of mass insider privatization and its concomitant weak
protection of small investors in Russia and other transition economies.
The crisis has led international policy makers to conclude that macro-
management is not sufficient to prevent crises and their contagion in an
integrated global economy. Thus, in South Korea, the International
Monetary Fund has imposed detailed structural conditions that go far
beyond the usual Fund policy. It is no coincidence that corporate
governance reform in Russia, Asia and Brazil has been a top priority
117. John Authers, The Short View, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 2008, at 15.
118. Paul Krugman, What to Do, N.Y. REV. BKS., Dec. 18, 2008, at 8, 10.
119. DAM, supra note 38, at 241. See, e.g., ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING FINANCE: EAST ASIA'S
ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2008).
120. DAM, supra note 38, at 241. What indeed do corporate crises disclose concerning capitalist
economic development around the globe, and legal systems? See, e.g., CURTIS A. MILHAUPT &
KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008).
121. ALICE DE JONGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S H-SHARE MARKET (2008).
Deeprooted is the issue of weak corporate governance for every Chinese state bank. Jamil Anderline,
China Grapples with the Downturn: Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.r 31, 2008, at 12. For that
matter, corporate India in 2009 panicked over India's dismal want of corporate governance. Majeet
Kripalani, Corporate India's Governance Crisis: Failures Like the Satyam Fraud Are Slowing the
Country's Economic Growth, BUS. WK., Jan. 26/Feb. 2, 2009, at 78.
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for the OECD, the World Bank and institutional investor activists.
122
The 1997-1998 Asian debacle heralded output and employment losses
genuinely appalling.
1 23
To be sure, in some degree an increase in wealth facilitates institution
building.124 Developing countries impeded by initially weak institutions,
which enjoyed an acceleration in growth (usually via a surge in
manufactures exports) could maintain such growth for fifteen years or
more. 125  One interpretation of the Asian Tigers
' 126 lightning growth 127
followed by crisis is, concisely, that the Tigers attained growth with
celerity despite weak institutions while still at a comparatively humble
level of development. Their failure to invest in institutional improvements
invited the Asian financial crisis.
The year 2009 proves premature to stipulate that China constitutes a
counterexample to the need to focus upon institutions in the developing
122. Marc Brecht, Patrick Bolton, & Ailsa Rrell, Corporate Law and Governance, in HANDBOOK
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 2 at 841 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
Well might the appraisal of the economic dynamism of Asia in the Third Millennium open with
assessment of the Asian financial crisis, and the subsequent flight of capital. See, e.g., ECONOMIC
DYNAMISM OF ASIA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS TO A NEW STAGE OF GROWTH
(Yoshinori Shimizu ed., 2007). Even now rules and regulations impede the Asian domestic bond
market, and deployment about the Asian region of much of the huge pools of capital in Asia. Further
development of local currency bond markets are needed to improve infrastructure in the Asian capital
markets. Governments have tried to develop these markets since the 1997-1998 financial crisis, but an
illiquid local corporate bond market imposes an illiquidity premium. Robert Morse, Vision Is Needed If
Asian Bond Markets Are to Come ofAge, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 2008, at 26.
123. John Pender, Post Credit Crunch Wealth Transfer Could Beggar Belief FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 3, 2008, at 18. "Indonesia's gross domestic product fell more than 13 percent between 1997 and
1998." Martin Wolf, Why Washington's Rescue Cannot End the Crisis Story, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 27, 2008, at II. Japan's nominal gross domestic product crested in 1997's second quarter, and
(according to Lehman Brothers) remained .4 percent beneath that level in 2008. David Pilling, Japan's
Aid Policy: Doing Less with Less, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2008, at 11.
124. DAM, supra note 38, at 276.
125. Id. (citing Simon Johnson, Jonathan Ostry & Arvind Subramanian, Levers for Growth, 43 FIN.
& DEV. 1, Mar. 2006).
126. In the view of one source virtually deemed an oracle, see, e.g., E. RAY CANTERBERY, ALAN
GREENSPAN: THE ORACLE BEHIND THE CURTAIN (2006):
A large segment of the erstwhile Third World, especially China, replicated the
successful economic export-oriented model of the so-called Asian Tigers: Fairly
well educated, low-cost workforces were joined with developed-world technology
and protected by an increasing rule of law, to unleash explosive economic growth.
Since 2000, the real GDP growth of the developing world has been more than
double that of the developed world.
Alan Greenspan, The Roots of the Mortgage Crises, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2007, at A19.
127. Cf AN EAST ASIAN RENAISSANCE: IDEAS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (Indermit Gill & Homi
Khara eds., 2007); EAST ASIAN VISIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Indermit Gill,
Yukon Huang & Homi Kharas eds., 2007). Indeed, was not the once-popular international political
premise of a Third World, see, e.g., VIJAY PRASHAD, THE DARKER NATIONS: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF
THE THIRD WORLD (2007), refuted by, inter alia, the extraordinary economic success in East Asia?
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nations, nor to the necessity of the rule of law in China herself.128 Possible
is interim development (short of attaining developed nation status) absent
strong legal institutions. 29 Indeed, Chinese GDP growth peaked at more
than 14 percent, but back in the early 1990s. 130 Nonetheless, maintainable
growth into more exalted per capita levels demands a considerable
development of legal institutions.
131
In medicine, a syndrome is a set of concurrent symptoms
distinguishing a disease.1 2 Is China vulnerable to the agonizing symptoms
which broke out over 1997-1998 in the cases of, e.g., Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia? Specifically, the query for 2009 is whether China's
institutional weaknesses, particularly of her financial sector, endanger her
growth rate (even as similar debilities diminished the growth rates of her
Asian neighbors).133  Lengthy is Beijing's history of dictating policy to
128. DAM, supra note 38, at 276. "The country has one official union, the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions, but it is government-run and has little independence. Efforts at setting up true unions
have always been crushed." Shai Oster, China Faces Unrest As Economy Falters, WALL ST. J., Dec.
22, 2008, at A8.
129. DAM, supra note 38, at 277.
The pattern is that as countries go from low to middling incomes people work much
longer hours-and also record big gains in productivity or in other words how much
output each of them can produce per hour worked-so the economy grows rapidly
and average standards of living rise. But when they grow richer still, hours of work
decline and further improvements in living standards have to come from higher
productivity alone. If they are not working longer, they can only get richer only by
working better. This is more difficult to do: the economy's growth rate is typically
far slower in rich economies than in the middle-income but catching-up ones, where
hours of work are rising as well as effort.
DIANE COYLE, SEX, DRUGS, AND ECONOMICS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS
190 (2004).
130. James T. Areddy, China Freezes Lending to Curb Investing Frenzy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2007, at Al, A13.
The 2007 growth of 11.4 percent, although robust, is not as high as the peak of the
1980s and '90s, when GDP growth in some years surpassed 15 percent. Jonathan
Anderson of the investment bank UBS says China's boom-bust cycles of those two
decades are being wound back into a more sustainable pattern.
Richard McGregor, A Superpower Happy To Be Past Its Peak, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2008, at 3.
131. DAM, supra note 38, at 277 (citing Dani Rodrik, Introduction: What Do We Learn from
Country Narratives, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 1-
19 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003). Between December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2007, the U.S. growth,
alone, exceeded the entire economy of the P.R.C. Steve Forbes, How Capitalism Will Save Us, FORBES,
Nov. 10, 2008, at 18. And only debatably might external actors make much difference toward
embedding the rule of law. See, e.g., CAROLYN BULL, NO ENTRY WITHOUT STRATEGY: BUILDING THE
RULE OF LAW UNDER UN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION (2008).
132. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1012 (2nd ed. 1948).
133. DAM, supra note 38, at 242.
Although lower wages among the tigers are keeping them competitive for now, they
are concerned about the future, because competition for foreign investment is
particularly intense. China's 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization
promoted a surge in foreign investment there, even as China's rivals in the region
saw their foreign investment shrink. Without fresh outside capital, the economies
of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand may all start looking like Japan's, where
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banks. 134 Regulators pressed bankers to address bad loans left over from
governmentally ordained "policy" lending during the 1990s. Further, since
2000 have authorities pushed banks to curtail loans to specific industries
deemed squandering investment. 135 A weak and ineffectual financial sector
could lead either to a crisis resembling the Asian financial crisis, or to a
more slowly expanding Chinese economy. Along either fork in that road, a
shaky financial sector is liable to hinder growth. 16 But what might unleash
financial devastation?
VI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY TEST SCHEDULED FOR 2010
A. CHINA PARTIES LIKE IT'S 1929: 2007
In February 2008, the government of China announced that during
January 2008 China had attracted $11.2 billion in foreign investment, up
109.8 percent from January 2007. 3 7 Mesmerized by China's economic
boom, an ambitious or avaricious readership perused titles 138 like: Billions
of Entrepreneurs: How China and India Are Reshaping their Futures and
Yours; 139 Managing the Dragon: How I'm Building a Billion Dollar
Business in China;'40 A Bull in China: Investing Profitably in the World's
Greatest Market;' 4' From Wall Street to the Great Wall: How Investors Can
Profit from China's Booming Economy; 42 Adam Smith in Beijing:
Lineages of the Twenty-First Century;143 and The Little Red Book of China
growth has been essentially zero since the mid-1990s and unemployment is a
chronic problem.
ROGER LEROY MILLER & DANIEL K. BENJAMIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MACRO ISSUES 20 (2nd ed.
2005).
134. Until recently, all were actually state-owned.
135. Areddy, supra note 130, at A13.
136. DAM, supra note 38, at 242. Cf PUBLIC FINANCE IN CHINA: REFORM AND GROWTH FOR A
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (2008).
137. China Reports Sharp Rise in Foreign Investment, DAILY REPORT, Feb. 19, 2008, at 6 (Atlanta)
(compiled from Associated Press).
138. "Can a hot book trend signal a soon-to-burst bubble?" Deborah Stead, BTW: So Many China
Books, It Must Be Over, BUS. WK., Jan. 21, 2008, at 17.
139. TARUNN KHANNA, BILLIONS OF ENTREPRENEURS: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE RESHAPING
THEIR FUTURES AND YOURS (2007).
140. JACK PERKOWSKI, MANAGING THE DRAGON: How I'M BUILDING A BILLION DOLLAR
BUSINESS IN CHINA (2008).
141. JIM ROGERS, A BULL IN CHINA: INVESTING PROFITABLY IN THE WORLD'S GREATEST MARKET
(2007).
142. BURTON MALKIEL, ET AL., FROM WALL STREET TO THE GREAT WALL: How INVESTORS CAN
PROFIT FROM CHINA'S BOOMING ECONOMY (2008).
143. GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, ADAM SMITH IN BEIJING: LINEAGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2008).
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Businesses•144
In autumn 2007, three of the half-dozen largest companies on earth
(by market capitalization) were Chinese. The market capitalization of
Chinese companies (listed both in China and abroad) totaled over double
China's GDP. 145 By comparison, U.S. stocks at their early 2000 crest were
capitalized at 183 percent of GDP. So intense was demand for Initial
Public Offerings 146 that their first day "pop" averaged over 200 percent.147
In early 2008, Beijing stood poised to relax its two-year ban against foreign, • • • I . 141
investment in China's booming domestic securities industry.
The Shanghai Composite Index reportedly spurted over 300 percent
between January 2007 and November 2007.149 In the two years preceding
late 2007, the Shanghai Composite Index had quintupled.5 Through
144. SHEILA MELVIN, THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF CHINA BUSINESSES (2007). Cf. TONY MEASOR,
SUCCESSFUL VALUE INVESTING IN ASIA: 10 TIMELESS PRINCIPLES BY TONY MEASOR (2007).
145. Edward Chancellor, Bursting China's Bubble Could Hurt, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 2007,
at 20. Editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review Hugo Restall explains:
China's stock market remains dysfunctional because it started as a no-cost source of
money for state-owned enterprises. Allowing the market to become a viable source
of capital for entrepreneurs would hurt these companies and those who own their
overpriced shares.
Hugo Restall, The Lessons From 30 Years of Chinese Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A23.
146. "An initial public offering (IPO) is a company's first sale of stock to the public. Securities
offered in an IPO are often but not always those of young, small companies seeking outside equity
capital and a public market for their stock. Investors purchasing stock in IPOs generally assume very
large risks for the possibility of large gains." DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS 176 (1988).
147. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20. There is debate over underpricing of Chinese IPOs:
PetroChina raised a record $9bn from its Shanghai listing, but if the shares had been
priced at today's level, even after the collapse since the first day of trading, the
company would have raised $4bn more. And, given that most of the large IPOs
have involved state-owned companies, it is the state leaving money on the table.
The World Bank calculated that in just the first five months of last year, the
government could have raised S9.5bn more if the flotations had been priced at the
first-day closing levels - a figure that is $1.5bn more than the central government
spent all last year on free education programs.
Geoff Dyer, China's IPO Boom Leaves a Sour Taste, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 2/3, 2008, at 13.
148. Sundeep Tucker & Geoff Dyer, Citigroup Joins Western Bankers Hoping to Cash in on China
Boom, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 2008, at 15. In 2008, China could launch a Nasdaq-like market
for technology enterprises. It would present more lenient listing requirements than do the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges. Stock probably would trade for more than in the United States, making that
market the more enticing to entrepreneurs. lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Carolyn Cui, The China-Stock
Rodeo, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9-10, 2008, at B1.
149. "The Shanghai stock market has climbed by around a third since early August and more than
300 percent since January." Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20. "Between October 2005 and October
2007, the Shanghai Composite Index rose more than 400 percent, before coming back down in recent
months." Dugan & Cui, supra note 148, at B2.
150. Gady A. Epstein, Shanghaied.- How Do You Say "Irrational Exuberance" in Chinese?,
FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 95, 96. China's stock exchange largely had traded in isolation and obscurity
for most of its 17-year history. Id. "China's stock market has roared back to life over the past two
years after spending years as one of the world's worst performers." Rick Carew, Citi Expands Sights in
China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2008, at C5. Governmental action-a sweeping change in the share
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2007, that Composite shot up 97 percent. 51 And at that it closed the year
14 percent beneath its October 2007 peak, 152 when it had notched a 128
percent gain for 2007. The Shanghai Composite Index had battened a
heftier 130 percent during 2006.53
The price-earnings ratio ("p/e") for the Composite closed 2007 at 59
times the prior year's earnings. At that the p/e ratio actually closed down
from its multiple of 71 at the October peak. And the composite closed
2007 at a trailing p/e average of 26.98. The Chinese domestically listed
equities, in mid-February 2008 trading at 37 times trailing earnings,
numbered among the globe's most costly. 1
56
By comparison, recall America's post-World War II trailing p/e
average approximating 14.5. Historical p/e ratios of the entire market
premised upon the last 12 months of reported earnings, from 1871 through
December 2006, fluctuated between its 1917 low of 5.31 and its 2002 46.71
high. 157  The p/e ratio in March 2008 for the Standard and Poor's 500-
looking ahead to 2008 earnings-was 13.2.158
structure of publicly traded companies-ignited the Chinese market in the middle of 2005. James T.
Areddy, For Investors, the Games Have Begun, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2008, at C1, C5.
151. China Led Global Markets in '07, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 2, 2008, at 1; Jonathan
Chang, Global Gains Continue - But for How Long?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2008, at R4; James T.
Areddy, China's Slower Profit Train Could Derail a Stock Boom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2008, at C 1.
152. China Led Global Markets in '07, supra note 151, at 1.
153. Chang, supra note 151, at R4.
154. Areddy, supra note 150, at C2. "The Shanghai Composite now trades at 14.4 times, versus 74
times at the peak, according to Credit Suisse." Leslie P. Norton, China's Stocks Rattle Investors,
Barron s, Nov. 10, 2008, at M8. Even on February 4, 2008, the p/e ratio of Shanghai shares measured
53 times 2007 profits. Areddy, supra note 150, at C5.
155. Joanna Slater and Antonio Regalado, Emerging Markets Feel Drag of US., WALL ST. J., Jan.
17, 2008, at CI.
156. To work out the quality of Chinese earnings turns upon the set of stocks examined, and
whether additional income-such as that of affiliates-is factored in. Anyway, Shanghai's exalted p/e
ratios minimized how dear China's stocks really were. Shanghai's Paper Tigers, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 14, 2008, at 14.
157. In the accounting of the Wharton School of the U. of Pennsylvania Russell E. Palmer Prof. of
Finance Jeremy J. Siegel. JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO
FINANCIAL MARKET RETURNS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 110-11 (4th ed., 2008).
"The very high number recorded for 2002 is due to very special circumstances." Id. at 110.
158. Tom Lauricella, Are Low P/Es a Valid Reason to Buy Stocks?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at
C1.
One complication is that earnings pogo around quite a bit. In calculating our p/e
ratios, and reciprocally our earnings yields, do we use trailing 12-month earnings?
Do we use next year's expected earnings? Do we use next year's expected operating
earnings? Each of these leads to distortions and a different "normal" p/e ratio.
Today for instance, the trailing 12-month earnings for the S&P 500 is $67, while
Wall Street's estimate for 2008 operating earnings is $97, leading to current p/e
ratios of 20 and 14 respectively. Robert Shiller, of Yale, came up with the elegant
expedient of averaging real earnings over a I 0-year span. This takes out the effects
of economic peaks and troughs and leads to a much cleaner measure of whether the
market is expensive or cheap.
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The Shanghai Composite Index tracks yuan denominated Class A
shares, and foreign currency denominated Class B shares. 159  Short-
selling 60 A shares is illegal in the Chinese markets. Therefore some
investors have shorted exchange-traded funds which track domestic
Chinese markets. 161  In China by late 2007, some five million new
brokerage accounts were opening monthly. Over 60 million trading
accounts (encompassing stocks and mutual funds) were opened during
2007 in China--over ten times the 2006 pace. 162  Shanghai's was the
fastest growing exchange of 2007, with trading volume up 428 percent (by
value). That gave it more trading than the Deutsche Bbrse, and established
it as number six globally (by value traded). 163  In December 2007 David
Roche predicted: "The big shock of 2008 will be that the China bubble
Robert Arnott, Bernanke and Politicians Must Try to Hit the Sweet Spot, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar.
8/9, 2008, at 4.
159. Shanghai Stumbles 1.4% as Snowfall Hurts Outlook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2/3, 2008 at B3.
On Chinese exchanges, the majority of stock is Class A shares traded in Yuan, the
Chinese currency, and the government limits how much of that can be owned by
non-Chinese investors. A smaller market of Class B shares, denominated in U.S.
dollars and Hong Kong dollars, is open to non-Chinese investors.
Dugan & Cui, supra note 148, at B2.
160. A "short sale" is "the sale of a security that must be borrowed to make delivery. Short sales
normally, but not always, entail the sale of securities that are not owned by the seller in anticipation of
profiting from a decline in the price of the securities... " ScOTT, supra note 146, at 324. Repugnant
to Beijing was anticipation of a stock decline.
161. Others take short positions in Hong Kong-listed Chinese enterprises. Epstein, supra note 150,
at 97; Ellen Sheng, Turning Defensive in China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2008, at C6. Mainland China is
not especially to be condemned for her resistance to short selling. Only in recent years have her
neighbors India, Malaysia, and Taiwan relaxed checks against short selling. Andy Mukherjee, Short
Sellers Will Make Indian Market Stronger, DLY. REPORT (Atlanta), Jan. 7, 2008, at 6. "Strictly
speaking, the Korean stock market is still an emerging market as it doesn't allow things such as shorting
of stocks domestically." Andrew Wood, Bullish Seoul Sets Its Sights on a Pivotal Role, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 16/17, 2008, at 12.
162. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20 (five million monthly); Dugan & Cui, supra note 148, at B2
(60 million in 2007). Unsurprisingly, small investors comprise a major constituency of the mainland's
market. Dyer, supra note 147, at 13. Are not China's unsophisticated small investors being exploited?
Prof. Burton G. Malkiel, coauthor of From Wall Street to the Great Wall: How Investors Can Profit
from China's Booming Economy, see Burton G. Malkiel, et al., supra note 142, declares:
The Chinese stock market-the so-called A-share market-is not efficient. One
anomaly is that the prices for a Chinese share in Hong Kong and New York tend to
be the same, but the same shares trade at premiums up to 100 percent in the A-share
market. These inefficiencies do not present an opportunity to foreign investors
unless one has one of the limited number of qualified foreign institutional investor
quotas. The market is essentially restricted to Chinese nationals living on the
mainland. Local Chinese institutions do take advantage of unsophisticated
investors and that is why managed funds in China tend to outperform the market
indices.
Investing in Chinese Equities, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2008, at 16.
163. James Mackintosh & Richard McGregor, LSE Plays Catch-Up With Rivals on China Lasting,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2008, at 17. In 2007, the million-dollar bonus had arrived in the Chinese
financial services industry. Geoff Dyer, Million Dollar Bonuses in China, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
23/24, 2008, at 5.
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pops."'
6 4
B. THE THUNDER OUT OF CHINA: 2008
Regulators had called for commercial banks to freeze lending through
2007. A China Banking Regulatory Commission official confirmed
"guidance aimed at supporting the macro control measures being
implemented."'165  While the freeze did not appear connected directly to the
stock bubble, it could leave the less cash to be plowed into stocks.
166
Curbing lending through hiking interest rates would more have comported
with a market oriented approach to business. 167 Indeed, Chinese officials
during 2007 increased lending rates a half-dozen times, and raised banking-
reserve requirements ten times. 168 To avert overheating, the People's Bank
of China in 2007 tightened policy rates from 6.12 to 7.47 percent.'
69
Even pre-2008, the Chinese stock market bubble resulting from
excess liquidity in the Chinese financial system was recognized
internationally. 170 This excessive liquidity had stemmed from Beijing's bid
to peg the yuan171 to the U.S. dollar. 172  In July 2005, Beijing ended the
yuan's informal peg to the dollar. However, Beijing continued tightly to
control the value of the yuan. 173  Critics assert that Beijing artificially
164. David Roche, The Global Money Machine, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at A21. "In China
and India, analysts warn that share prices had by early 2008 reached bubble-like levels and could be
vulnerable to serious corrections." Patrick Barta & Marcus Walker, Developing Economies Face
Reckoning as U.S. Stumbles, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2008, at 1, A14.
165. Areddy, supra note 130, at Al.
166. Id. at A13.
167. Id. at Al. "The authorities must stuff the inflation genie back in the bottle. It is not going to
be easy in an economy where highly controlled financial markets render normal instruments of
monetary control relatively ineffective." Kenneth Rogoff, China May Yet Be the Economy to Lose
Sleep Over, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 5, 2008, at 11.
168. Chang, supra note 151, at R4. "China raised interest rates six times last year, most recently in
December, putting it among the relatively small number of economies moving in the opposite direction
from the U.S. Federal Reserve's recent series of rate cuts." Andrew Batson, China 's Price Rise Is
Fastest Since 1996, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2008, at A4.
169. John Authers, The Short View, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 3, 2008, at 17.
170. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20. To be sure, some commentators welcome a bubble. See,
e.g., DANIEL GROSS, Pop!: WHY BUBBLES ARE GREAT FOR THE ECONOMY (2007).
171. Bradsher, supra note 57, at B1. "China's relatively pegged exchange rate system has led the
authorities to flood the economy with renminbi." Rogoff, supra note 167, at 11. Opined Prof. Burton
G. Malkiel: "I believe the Yuan is the most undervalued currency in the world and it will continue to
appreciate." Investing in Chinese Equities, supra note 162, at 160.
172. Edward A. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20. "Asian governments, fearful that too strong a
currency would make exports less competitive, often have intervened in markets to keep their
currencies from appreciating too much against the dollar." Craig Karmin, As the Dollar Craters, Bets
Are on Its Bottom, WALL ST. J., April 1,2008, at C7.
173. Geoff Dyer, Paulson in Last Stand Against Weaker Renminbi, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 4,
2008, at 3 (citing Thomson Datastream); Francisco Blanch, Emerging Markets Hold Key to Oil and
THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
suppressed that currency's value to make Chinese exports cheaper and
more competitive.7 4  This artificially suppressed interest rates. Said
suppression led to misallocating capital, i.e., overinvestment. 175 That tale is
an ancient one.
For the so-called business cycle process always is born of credit
expansion. Vital is that an expansion of credit lifts prices above their true
market level. Too, it lowers the interest rate beneath its true market level,
conjuring malinvestment 76  Now borrowing firms are misled into
supposing that wealth is at hand, rendering (supposedly) profitable lops
term projects previously dismissed (accurately) as unprofitable.'
Therefore, the business cycle's recurrent features include the boom phase,
during which prices and production activity expand.
178
Capital goods are produced goods, which must combine yet further
Dollar Moves, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 10, 2008, at 26.
China is still unwilling to let the renminbi float freely, because it does not want to
cede control of its economy to market forces. Since depegging the currency from
the dollar in July 2005, the Chinese authorities have closely managed its exchange
rate.
The remninbi has been allowed to appreciate only gradually so as to boost the
Chinese manufacturing sector, on which an increasing proportion of the country's
population depends. Before October it was allowed to rise at a steady annual rate of
about 5 percent a year. This policy has not only seen China build up a significant
trade surplus, but also, at $1,528bn, the largest stockpile of foreign exchange
reserves in the world.
Peter Graham, Hopes Raised for New Phase in Renminbi's Liberalisation, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
26, 2008, at 29.
174. Id. Here is the verdict of Paris School of Economics Prof. Xavier Ragot and Jean-Louis Beffa
(Chair of Saint-Goban and Co-President of the Coumot Center for Economic Studies: "China is keeping
its currency artificially low in order to increase its trade surplus and lower its costs of production vis-a-
vis competitor countries." Jean-Louis Beffa & Xavier Ragot, The Fall of a Financial Model, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 2008, at 9. For that matter, in China's international finance hub of Hong
Kong, Jonathan Cheng, How Fed Rate Cuts Are Helping to Fuel a Hong Kong Boom, WALL ST. J., Feb.
13, 2008, at B 1, B 10, Hong Kong still pegs its own dollar to American currency. Id. at B 1.
Of course, the integration of China's surging economy, see, e.g., CHINA'S SURGING ECONOMY:
ADJUSTING FOR MORE BALANCED DEVELOPMENT (John Wong & Wei Lu eds., 2007), into the world
economy has implications for Beijing's economic practices (including its exchange rate regime). See
e.g., GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA (Yang Yeo & Linda Yueh eds., 2006).
China's current account surplus for 2007 approximated 10.5 percent of GDP. That was unprecedented
for a China-sized economy. McGregor & Guha, supra note 59, at 2.
China's currency, the renminbi, which has appreciated by about 12 percent since
Beijing officially broke its peg with the US dollar in mid-2005, has helped limit the
surplus by making imports cheaper. But the appreciation to date does not yet
appear to have had any material impact on China's exports, which remain hyper-
competitive.
Id.
175. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20.
176. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 2 MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 862 (1970).
177. Id. at 856.
178. Id. at 745
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with additional factors to satisfy consumer appetites. 179 Within the boom
phase nestles a more profligate boom in the heavy capital goods and higher
order industries. These include industrial raw materials, construction,
machine goods, and the markets in titles thereto, e.g., the stock market and
real estate markets. 180  (Remember those misdirected borrowing firms?)
Sure enough, industrial output and infrastructure investments have
outstripped even China's officially posted nationwide growth rates. For
January-June 2007 theyl respectively swelled by 18.5 and (perhaps more
tellingly) 21 percent.' As trumpeted during 2007 of China: "People
speculate in stocks in Shanghai and real estate in Shenzhen because money
is cheap."'
182
The cyclical terminus is the slump, unmasking the boomtime's easy
credit conjured malinvestment183 (in higher order investments, unprofitable
in an honest interest rate market). 184 Once money has diffused economy-
wide, 185 an honest market's actual consumer sovereignty resurrects itself.
86
Consumers evidence which boomtime investments were unprofitable, as
those consumers reassert their actual preferences (as expressed at the
market interest rate, once relieved of its immediately preceding credit
distortion). 187 Consequently, the China of 2008. Therein the overcapacity
179. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 1 MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 258 (1970).
180. ROTHBARD, supra note 176, at 745.
181. Righter, supra note 37, at 22.
182. Chancellor, supra note 149, at 20.
Estimates that China accounts for half of all construction activity on the planet may
not be wide of the mark. This national building mania impresses foreigners; but to
the Chinese it looks more and more like "irrational exuberance." In speeches of
clear urgency, China's leaders have begun to paint a grim picture of a cavalier
disregard of cost-benefit and risk-profit calculations, huge waste and bad bank
loans. Wen Jiabao, the Prime Minister, has repeatedly read the riot act about
"irrational economic structures and low quality and returns" and shortages of "top-
notch proficient personnel". China's capital-intensive, profligate and
environmentally destructive growth path, he told last year's national conference of
Chinese scientists, "is unsustainable and we absolutely must stop."
Righter, supra note 33, at 24. The capital-intensive misdirection of funds into a national construction
mania is the rational consequence of an irrational expansion of liquidity.
183. ROTHBARD, supra note 179, at 745.
184. Id. at 860.
185. Id. at 857.
186. Id. at 860.
187. Id. at 858. In real life, pain and inefficiency can accompany the reassertion of true consumer
preferences:
It is the return of confidence, to speak in ordinary language, which is so
insusceptible to control in an economy of individualistic capitalism. This is the
aspect of the slump which bankers and business men have been right in
emphasising, and which the economists who have put their faith in a "purely
monetary" remedy have underestimated.
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 317 (1964). Keynes'
reference to "purely monetary" economists reminds one that markets can be shaped by financial models
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of 2005-2007 was being squeezed from the Chinese economy. t88
(Remember that misallocated capital, i.e., overinvestment?)
Asset price bubbles build (and pop) in 2009 as they have since the
early eighteenth century, when modem competitive markets evolved. For
here is the verdict from former Treasury Department Undersecretary for
Finance Peter Fisher on America's 2006-2008 housing bubble burst and
2007-2009 stock market collapse:
In the middle years of this decade, we had negative real short-term
interest rates. And that really means free money, which really distorts
the system. Capitalism is premised on the idea that capital is a scarce
commodity rationed with a price mechanism. It wasn't just a handful
of clever guys on Wall Street who figured out what to do with the free
money. People all over the housing and financial services industries
figured out ways to lever themselves up way too far. That's the engine
that led us this far astray.'
89
People speculate in stocks and real estate because money is cheap.
By no means are the populace, nor the rulers, of China to be singled out for
castigation over financial mismanagement in view of China's recent
bubbles in stocks and real estate.
If this is so often told a tale, why does risk management, premised
upon state of the art statistical models, so poorly perform? 90 Because the
underlying data exploited to estimate a model's structure draw, generally,
from both intervals of euphoria and of fear.' 91 Spans of euphoria (e.g., in
China during 2007) are extremely hard to suppress. The speculative fever
must break on its own (e.g., in China during 2008). These contraction
phases of credit/business cycles, fear driven, historically have been far
more abrupt (and fleeting) than the expansion phase, fueled by a slow yet
cumulative euphoria buildup. 1
92
themselves. DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE NOT A CAMERA: How FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE
MARKETS (2006).
188. McGregor, supra note 130, at 3.
189. Maria Bartiromo, Facetime: BlackRock's Peter Fisher on When the Pain Will End, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 20, 2008, at 21, 22. Explains the Vice-Chairman of UBS Investment Bank, professional economist
and former U.S. Senator Phil Graham: "The Fed's sharp, prolonged reduction in interest rates
stimulated a housing market that was already booming-triggering six years of double-digit increases in
housing prices during a period when the general inflation rate was low." Phil Gramm, Deregulation
and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at Al 7.
190. After all, public finance in China would seem in need of harnessing risk management insights
from the economists' academic command of the credit/business cycle. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN CHINA: REFORM AND GROWTH FOR A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Shuilin Wang and
Jiwei Lou eds., 2008).
191. These swings of euphoria and fear repeating through the generations evince scant evidence of
any learning curve.
192. Given that we never command an impeccable risk model, comprehensible was Mr.
Greenspan's doleful subsequent review of his career as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. See,
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In August 2008, property sales in China fell 15 percent over the
preceding year. The National Bureau of Statistics reported sales falling
over 39 percent in Shanghai and 55 percent in Beijing. Real estate
accounts for a quarter of all investment on the mainland (approximately
twice the American level). Too, that August prices nationwide registered a
downtick, the initial instance in years when they had not grown. 193
And that stupendous thunderthud that you hear from China is the
nosedive of the Shanghai Composite Index, and of the smaller 94 Shenzhen
market. This was the picture drawn as early as March 2008:
As the year turned, the world's fears were invested in the US. All its
hopes were turned to China. That has changed. Anxiety about China
has suddenly spiked. This was partly because the bubble in its
domestic equity market has burst. The Shanghai Composite is down
31.6 per cent from its October peak-more than the NASDAQ
Composite had dropped at the same state after the tech bubble burst.
Hong Kong-quoted H-shares and New York-quoted ADRs are down a
bit less, but still by more than 20 per cent. PetroChina, the biggest
Chinese company, has fallen by half since its November peak. 1
95
In 2008, the Shanghai Composite Index had fallen 72 percent from its
October 2007 record high. 196 At that, its p/e ratio stood about 23 percent
above the p/e ratio of the All Country-World Index. 
19 7
How profoundly can an emerging market plunge? The worst
capitulation in emerging market history opened in 1997. Over 1997-1998,
the Indonesian, Russian, and Thai markets retreated over 90 percent (in
U.S. dollars). Those in the Philippines and South Korea gave up over 80
percent. And stocks in Hong Kong and Singapore fell by 70 percent.
198
Moreover, history instructs that extremely sharp increases in stock prices
seldom are followed by the gradual return to comparative price stability.
99
e.g., Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 2008, at 1; Alan Beattie & James Politi, 'I Made a Mistake" Admits Greenspan, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 24, 2008, at 1.
193. Frederik Balfour & Chi-Chu Tschang, A Housing Sinkhole Starts to Spread, Bus. WK., Nov. 3,
2008, at 84.
194. Andrew Wood, Chinese Shares Tumble in Fresh Sign of Deflating Market Bubble, FN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 23, 2007, at 15.
195. John Authers, The Short View, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 13, 2008, at 15.
196. Kopin Tan, Is Sober Retreat in the Wings?, BARRON'S, Dec. 1, 2008, at M2, M4. "Shanghai's
ascent saw A shares rise 456 percent in the two years to October 2007. In the following 12 months,
they gave way by 72 percent." John Authers, The Short View, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 13, 2009, at
13.
197. John Authers, The Short View, FIN. TIMES (London), July 3, 2008, at 13.
198. Siegel, supra note 157, at 166.
199. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET: A TIME-TESTED STRATEGY
FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 50 (rev. and updated, 2007).
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C. THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA: 2009
Colossal bubbles have typified early capitalism. 200  Once bubbles
burst, bad debts surface, invariably. The financial system goes through the
wringer. It was grasped that once China's excess extra liquidity were
mopped up, not only would the stock market tumble and profits contract,
but the banking system could suffer as well. So must be set the stage for
Beijing's test of 2009: Can China flourish all the way to developed nation
status without the rule of law?
What precisely might Beijing do to advance the rule of law during
2009, in the wake of the pricking of the stupendous Shanghai Composite
Index bubble? China's official data disclose that in excess of 100 million
people had invested in equities (mostly during the pre-October 16, 2007,
bull market). Angered retail investors, following their bubble's burst,
plausibly will demand investigations into corporate monkey business.
Even largescale public protest looms as a possibility. Thousands of irate
investors demonstrated at Ministry of Finance headquarters the day
following that Ministry's increase by .2 percent of the trading tax during
May 2007.
Beijing should react to public pressure by punishing individuals and
companies which engaged in illegal dealings during the heady bubble years
climaxing in 2007. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (the
watchdog over the market) ought to open its investigative proceedings to
the populace. 20 1 Beijing should make a virtue of necessity by rendering its
China Securities Regulatory Commission genuinely independent. That
Commission's institutional autonomy crucially could indicate Beijing's
post-crisis commitment to reform.
In 2008, the Commission was a bureaucracy staffed with political
appointees. 2°2 They wielded limited power to enforce regulation. To de-
link the China Securities Regulatory Commission from the Communist
Party's patronage network, and to appoint genuinely respected persons
(including foreigners) experienced in financial regulation to the truly
200. See, e.g., JANE KAMENSKY, THE EXCHANGE ARTISTS: A TALE OF HIGH-FLYING SPECULATION
AND AMERICA'S FIRST BANKING COLLAPSE (2008); PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS (2001); DOUGLAS WATT, THE PRICE OF SCOTLAND: DARIEN,
UNION AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (2007) (Darien Scheme). But a stock market boom-bust cycle
cannot accurately be identified with laissez faire. See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA'S
GREAT DEPRESSION (5th ed., Mises Institute 2005) (1963) (administration of President Herbert
Hoover).
201. Chancellor, supra note 145, at 20.
202. Minxin Pei & Wayne Chen, A Crash Is China's Chance for Financial Reforms, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 13, 2008, at 13. But the Commission then was subject of continuing rumors concerning
senior-level job shifts, as parcel of a wider reshuffling of officials quinquennially. Dyer, supra note
147, at 13.
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independent new Commission should become a priority.203 This would
constitute a timely step along the lengthy road to the rule of law. Only
slowly, through sometimes painful trial and error, will elites accept that it is
in their self interest to submit to the rule of law.2 °4
At least in principle, in agriculture it is not landownership which
matters. A government is not necessarily a farmer's more incompetent
landlord than is a private landowner. What counts is whether the
agriculturist enjoys property rights in her produce. The typical anemic
agricultural productivity in socialist economies stems from conditions of
those economies overall, and from agriculture's relationships respectively
to markets for inputs and outputs, and to the nonagricultural sectors. In
China, per capita grain production was identical in 1936, 1957, and
1977.2°5
Already one discerns impressive evidence of the payoff in China from
secure property rights. Explained economist Craig Richardson, of China:
Its economic growth has depended upon a property-rights system with
varying degrees of security. There appears to be a three-tier system of
property rights, depending on where the property is located and who
owns it. Peasant farmers have the least protection, city residents have
better protection, and foreign investors have the most secure property
rights.
There hasn't been a single case of a foreigner investor losing property
during the past 50 years. Foreigners have developed a high level of
trust with the Chinese. Foreigners often build in rural areas, but they
don't negotiate with individual farmers over the purchase of land, since
farmers work under the auspices of so-called Town Village
206Enterprises.
203. Pei & Chen, supra note 202, at 13. Reflect on the report of Martin Richenhagen, chief
executive of the planet's number three tractor manufacturer (Agco): "There is no proper written law in
China," says Mr. Richenhagen. "A lot of what is described as law is decided on the basis of feelings or
political fashion," he said. "It makes for a difficult environment for companies," he added. Peter
Marsh, Manufacturer Says China's Global Prowess Exaggerated, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 26, 2008,
at 21.
204. Niall Ferguson, Is Political Freedom in Retreat?, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 26/27, 2008, at 2.
In any case, the influence of business (both foreign and domestic) upon Chinese national public policy
is on the rise. See, e.g., SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA (2008).
205. JULIAN L. SIMON, EFFORT, OPPORTUNITY, AND WEALTH 125 (1987) (citing D. Gale Johnson,
Agriculture in the Centrally Planned Economies, AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 845, 849 (1982).
206. Craig Richardson, China's New Landed Gentry: Foreigners, BARRON'S, Oct. 27, 2008, at 55.
A TVE is a land collective that lets farmers receive the fruit of their labors, but
decides from year to year how land will be allocated. The mayors or managers of
the TVEs are directed by China's central government to be self-supporting; no one
expects government bailouts from Beijing. TVEs act as if they were for-profit
corporations, with peasants in the role of de facto employees, rather than property
owners. TVEs compete with each other in wooing foreign investors, promising
them tax breaks and land. A foreign company can generate far more tax revenue
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This property rights system, unthwarted by special interests, resolves
around the interrelationship of foreign investors and the TVE. The TVE
enforces foreign land rights; foreign companies reciprocally deliver tax
revenues According to a 2006 analysis by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, workers in foreign-owned companies number just 3
percent of the Chinese laborforce, but their productivity is eight times the
greater, accounting for approximately 40 percent of GDP growth overall. °7
Excruciatingly protracted remains the road to the rule of law in
Communist China. Chinese courts are not independent of the Communist
Party. Courts decline, often, to hear politically sensitive cases. As many
as 300 attorneys have been jailed, some for speaking out concerning human
rights. Amnesty International (plus other groups) have raised voices over a
crackdown on attorneys (and other rights defenders) who embrace causes
carrying a political charge.2 °8 As declaimed on December 10, 2008, by the
bold signatories of Charter 08, a public summons for China to become an
open society:
The political reality, which is plain for anyone to see, is that China has
many laws but no rule of law; it has a constitution but no constitutional
government. The ruling elite continues to cling to its authoritarian
power and fights off any move toward political change. The stultifying
results are endemic official corruption, an undermining of the rule of
law, weak human rights, decay in public ethics, crony capitalism,
growing inequality between the wealthy and the poor, pillage of the
natural environment as well as of the human and historical
environments, and the exacerbation of a long list of social conflicts,
especially, in recent times, a sharpening animosity between officials
and ordinary people. As these conflicts and crises grow ever more
intense, and as the ruling elite continues with impunity to crush and to
strip away the rights of citizens to freedom, to property, and to the
pursuit of happiness, we see the powerless in our society-the
vulnerable groups, the people who have been suppressed and
monitored, who have suffered cruelty and even torture, who have had
no adequate avenues for their protests, no courts to hear their pleas-
becoming more militant and raising the possibility of a violent conflict
of disastrous proportions. The decline of the current system has
reached the point where change is no longer optional. 2°9
and many more jobs than a rice-paddy farmer.
Id.
207. Id.
208. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Sky Canaves, & Juliet Ye, Chinese Seek a Day in Court, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2008, at A12.
209. CHINA's CHARTER 08, supra note 29, at 54. Predictable was Beijing's response: "Currently,
the security forces are cracking down on intellectuals associated with Charter 08, an appeal for
democracy and human rights that many see as the most significant such document since 1989 and
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What is at stake in all of this?
VII. THE GLOBAL STAKE IN CHINA: 2010
A. THE IMMEDIATE YANK STAKE
The Chinese performance in 2010 must be of more than theoretical
interest to American analysts. The United States dictates the international
monetary affairs agenda even following the colossal financial tumult of
2008.210 The macroeconomic role of a modern financial market is to pool
risk, to share information, and to deliver liquidity. Sans a smoothly
running financial market entailing appropriate informational flow, and risk
pooling, there would prove less finance for venture capital, and private
equity.21  Given that efficient financial systems allocate capital to
businesses with the highest growth potential, financial development is a
cause of (not just a consequence of) economic growth. That has been
established firmly by economic research of the past two decades. And the
American finance industry offers more support for emerging companies
than does its European counterpart.212 The trend within U.S. capitalism is
which has, defying Beijing's net censorship, been collecting signatories over the web." Kathrin Hille,
China Steps Up Internet Censors' Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 5, 2009, at 4. "The country's
efficient repression apparatus has swung into action, with at least 70 of the 303 people who initially
signed the charter summoned or interrogated." Jamil Anderlini & Kathrin Hille, Crackdown Lays Bare
China's Harsher Stance, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3/4, 2009, at 3.
All mention in the charter of Chinese is blocked from websites, search engines and
even e-mails. Propaganda officials have banned domestic media from interviewing
any signatories or publishing any of their work. According to Amnesty
International, the authorities now consider the charter a "counter-revolutionary
platform", a likely sign that signatories will be dealt with more harshly.
Id.
210. Daniel Gros & Stefano Micossi, Brussels Must Start Issuing Sovereign Debt, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 30, 2008, at 9.
211. Wolfgang Mdnchau, The Credit Revolution Looks at the Long Term, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 7, 2008, at 9.
212. According to N.Y.U. Stem School of Business Prof. Thomas Phillipon, and Nicholas Viron,
research fellow at Bruegel:
[T]he American finance industry offers more support for the growth of emerging
companies than its European counterpart. Economic research in the past 20 years
has firmly established that financial development is not only a consequence, but
also a cause of economic growth. Efficient financial systems enable the allocation
of capital to businesses and entrepreneurs with the highest growth potential.
Europe's recent financial development has been impressive but remains
unbalanced. The continent's large companies can now rely on deep, liquid and
efficient capital markets. But every available indicator suggests that emerging
enterprises benefit from a wider range of appropriate financing solutions in the US
than in Europe.
Thomas Philipon & Nicholas Vdron, Europe's Saplings Need Financial Fertiliser, FIN. TIMES
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the gathering subordination of operations and the preeminence of
21324finance. Finance has trumped industry.214
Financial services-prior, at least, to the 2007-2009 financial
tempest-represented almost the last thing wherein the United States yet
excelled worldwide.21 5 The finance industry's contribution to the economy
increased from 2.3 percent of GDP during 1947 to 4.4 percent in 1977. It
reached 7.7 percent of GDP by 2005.21 Students studying toward the
M.B.A. at topranked American schools favored employment with financial
services institutions.21 7 Of Harvard's M.B.A. class of 2008, 41 percent
selected market-sensitive careers, actually topping the 40 percent of her
class of 2007.218 General Electric reaped from financial services 34 percent
of its pretax earnings. Caterpillar (earthmoving equipment), Deere & Co.
(tractors), and Pitney Bowes (postage meters) each pockets a minimum of
12 percent of its earnings via financing things.219 A report on the top fifty
(London), Feb. 12, 2008, at 15.
213. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Tyranny of the Market, BUS. WK., July 30, 2007, at 90. Is not
money's ascent a global saga? See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE WORLD (2008).
214. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY (2007).
If one must get permission from a wide variety of agencies, and file a long series of
complex environmental impact statements, and worry that after building a plant and
hiring workers, the plant cannot be closed and the workers let go if conditions
require, and on and on and on, then potential entrepreneurs will be less likely to
take big risks in putting a satellite in space, or mining the sea, or building a nuclear
fusion plant. Instead, individuals and entrepreneurial firms will turn to financial
adventuring such as selling tax shelters and fighting to take over existing firms.
SIMON, supra note 205, at 162-63. But some complained that America's politicians err in gambling the
country's future on finance. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY (2008).
215. According to veteran investment professional Dean LeBaron. Sandra Ward, Awash in a Sea of
Debt, BARRON'S, July 24, 2006, at 34. "U.S. exports of services, such as financial, accounting, legal,
and other business services, rose strongly in the fourth quarter." James C. Cooper, A Plug for a Leaky
Economy, BUS. WK., Mar. 3, 2008, at 10. On the other hand, not everyone proves an enthusiast of the
financial services field. Virgin Airlines' Richard Branson brags: "Virgin speaks in normal language
instead of using phrases that nobody understands, like 'financial service industry."' 10 Questions,
TIME, Dec. 31, 2007, at 12.
216. David Wessel, A Burst Bubble May Be a Boon, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A2. On the
other hand, during 2007 over 65,000, jobs were eliminated at American investment banks. They
endured major writedowns on their investments in complex structured products. Robert Cookson,
Stacy-Marie Ishmael, & Sarah O'Connor, Worldwide Financial Job Losses Triple in 2007, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 18, 2008, at 14.
217. 100 Top MBA Employer 2006, FORTUNE, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
mbal00/fulllist/. "In 1965, 50% of Harvard's M.B.A. class went into manufacturing. That fraction is
down to 18% now. Financial services went from 19% to 4 1%." William Baldwin, Editorial, We're All
Financiers Now, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 22. "America's share of the world's total annual
manufacturing has remained virtually level since 1982." Knight Kiplinger, Editorial, Our Mighty
Factories, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., Jan. 2008, at 24.
218. MBA Market Index, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 26, 2008, at 10 (citing http://www.ft.com/
gapper.blog).
219. Bernard Condon & Jack Gage, Loans "R" Us, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 46. Sony owns 60
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centers of commerce found London leaving New York in the second place
slot (but with third ranked Tokyo followed by Chicago).22°
Earlier had North explained that the main reason for modem
economies' services sector growth is that resources become devoted to
transacting. Transaction costs are entailed by exchange. As specialization
and its concomitant division of labor have waxed, so has the sum of
exchanges. External to a firm, banking, insurance, finance, wholesale and
retail trade (atop a goodly chunk of governmental functions) all are a
portion of the transaction sector.22' Internal to a firm, bloating numbers of
accountants and attorneys facilitate exchanges and a complex environment
of impersonal exchange.22  The progress from personal to impersonal
exchange magnifies the sum of transaction costs, invariably.223  Yet the
consequence marks a drastic cut in production expenses. This more than
counterweighs the heavier resources allocated into transacting. 4  This
made for the dramatic expansion of the modem economies.2 5
It is plain that the United States (and the United Kingdom) felt less
Chinese competition in the business cycle now just concluded than had the
percent of a finance company (Sony Financial). Id. at 48. In 2006, 82 percent of Sony's $ 1.1 billion in
pretax earnings derived from its financial unit. This was double the sum raked in by its pictures
division through producing films like CASINO ROYALE and THE DAVINCI CODE. Id.
220. Alan Beattie, London Named Top Financial Centre, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2007, at 3.
Perhaps the definitive book on financial structures in the European Union is PETER NORMAN,
PLUMBERS AND VISIONARIES (2008). The world's largest financial exchange (in notional value traded)
is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Emily Lambert, Up from the Pits, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2008, at 64,
66.
221. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 91 (2005).
222. Id. Or as Dr. Garry Wills anticipated North:
One long-recognized use of capital is to give leisure for planning, inventing,
tinkering, teaching new workmen, etc. In that sense, capital has always flowed in to
a "knowledge industry." Furthermore, the production of wealth is incomplete
without its distribution and protection. It does no good to produce thousands of
shoes if you cannot find people who want them, or if the people who want them just
come and grab them for free. By considering problems of distribution and
protection, the knowledge industry completes the production process.
GARRY WILLS, CONFESSIONS OF A CONSERVATIVE 145 (1980) (emphasis in original).
223. NORTH, supra note 221, at 91.
224. Id.
225. Id. A critical role for public coordinating institutions in furnishing the prerequisites for market
stability and economic recovery has been suggested relative to postwar European capitalism. See, e.g.,
Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (2005).
James Tobin, awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1981, BANNOCK, ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 410, declared: "It was a bunch of planners-Truman, Churchill, Keynes, Marshall,
Acheson, Monnet, Schumann, MacArthur in Japan-whose vision made possible the prosperous
postwar world." JAMES TOBIN, WORLD FINANCE AND ECONOMIC STABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
JAMES TOBIN 210 (2003). (It is thanks to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur that Japanese
corporate law is based on the law of Illinois. DAM, supra note 38, at 174.)
It has been supposed that the ideal of an atomistic and anonymous market remains potent, but is
probably to endure as an ideal. See, e.g., CAITLIN ZALOOM, OUT OF THE PITS: TRADERS AND
TECHNOLOGY FROM CHICAGO TO LONDON (2006).
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large economies of central Europe.226  As well, with their
disproportionately outsized financial sectors, those two countries likewise
had reaped a financial windfall from the rise of China (and of other
emerging markets).227 Still, the United States and United Kingdom would
do well to beware of a 2008 Chinese stock market collapse, and 2010
emergence in Beijing of the China Syndrome previously evident in the
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. An ebbing tide strands every boat.
B. THE LONG-TERM STAKE INTERNATIONALLY
Furthermore, the whole world inevitably is invested in a China of
2010 approaching developed nation status (in the contemporary
international order) via opting for the rule of law. Princeton University
Professor G. John Ikenberry propounds that the American led, post-Second
World War international order has been historically unique. 22' The
institutions and rules thereof are rooted in (and reinforced by) capitalism
and democracy.229
Particularly has a triad of specific features of this Western order
proved critical to its success, and to its durability: 230 "First, unlike the
imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and
norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for




1 In Ikenberry's account of this Western order nondiscrimination is
reflected, somewhat, Buchanan's principle of generality (as a key to the
rule of law). Second is the coalition based nature of the Western order's
leadership. 232 Moreover: "Third, the postwar Western order has an
unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and
institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule based
than any previous order., 233 Ikenberry's account of this Western order's
predilection for rules echoes, somewhat, the North, Wallis, and Weingast
accent upon the rule of law for elites (as a key to an open access order).
New York University Professor of Economics William J. Baumol
sometimes asserts that there is no profession the total economic product of
226. John Plender, The Pitfalls of Financial Globalisation Grow Clearer, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 21, 2007, at 28.
227. Id.
228. G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System
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which exceeds that of attorneys.234 But there exists no profession the
marginal contribution of which proves slighter!
235
Given the first of these features (market openness) and the third
(system of rules and institutions) be advised that-as few westerners are
aware--China and the Association of South East Asian Nations have
agreed to create the world's largest free trade area.236 This will encompass
1.7 billion people.237 Their project contrasts with the American (and
European) publics' loss of faith in free trade.238 The China of 2010 must
feel two propensities: "China not only needs continued access to the global
capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and
institutions provide., 239  The mounting interdependence of Pacific
economies could make a pillar of global economic growth and stability.
240
It might be possible for China economically to overtake America,
alone. Yet it is unlikely that China ever could overshadow the wider
Western order:
241
But when the economic capacity of the Western system as a whole is
considered, China's economic advances look much less significant; the
Chinese economy will be much smaller than the combined economies
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development far
into the future. This is even truer of military might: China cannot hope
to come anywhere close to total OECD military expenditures anytime
soon. The capitalist democratic world is a powerful constituency for
the preservation-and, indeed, extension--of the existing international
order. If China intends to rise up and challenge the existing order, it
has a much more daunting task than simply confronting the United
234. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 68 (2002).
Capitalism requires markets in which the participants can have confidence in any
agreements arrived at. It is driven by the pursuit of accumulated and retainable
wealth and opportunities to expand that wealth by devoting it to the production
process. Sanctity of property and contract, and institutions that can be relied upon
to enforce them both, are necessary conditions for the creation of capitalists and for
effective execution of their role. That is why, without the contribution of the
lawyers, the free-market economies might never have evolved. And even if they
had, it is unlikely that their unprecedented growth could have occurred. It is on
these grounds that I base my evaluation of the enormous total contribution of
lawyers to the performance of the industrial economies.
Id. at 69.
235. Id. at 68. "Alas, no successful civilization in history-Greece, Rome, England, France, the list
goes on-ever found prosperity through its bureaucrats and lawyers." Victor Davis Hanson, 'Post-
Industrial'America Needs Can-Do Leaders, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY., July 22, 2008, at A13.
236. Kishore Mahbubani, Why Asia Stays Calm in the Storm, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 29, 2008,
at 11.
237. Id.
238. Id. "Japan and India have similar FTAs with Asean." Id.
239. Ikenberry, supra note 228, at 32.
240. Mahbubani, supra note 236, at 11.
241. Ikenberry, supra note 228, at 36.
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States.242
And, perhaps, economic development can help midwive democracy
("capitalist democratic world").
VIII. THE SPECTER OF 1997-1998
Unfortunately, evidence suggested that China's output alarmingly
shrank in October 2008. Economic conditions appeared to be deteriorating
speedily. Remember the cyclical terminus? In the 70 largest cities, house
prices downticked .3 percent between September 2008 and October
2008.243 They downticked another .5 percent between October 2008 and
November 2008. In Shenzhen, housing prices by late November had
eroded by 14.8 percent since November 2007 alone. China's economy
relies upon real estate investment for 9.2 percent of G.D.P.
244
China admitted to a 9.6 percent decline in electricity generation in
November 2008 from a year earlier. There was a 12.4 percent plunge in
crude steel production over November 2007-November 2008. Finished
steel was down 11 percent.245 China's November 2008 passenger auto
sales marked a 12 percent year-over-year drop.246 The Purchasing
Manager's Index (which is prepared by the China Federation of Logistics
and Purchasing) in October 2008 fell to a seasonally adjusted 44.6. This
marked the lowest reading since the July 2005 inauguration of that
247gauge. According to preliminary data from China's General
Administration of Customs, her October 2008 diesel fuel imports of 80,000
metric tons proved well beneath the 338,838 tons imported during
September 2008. This October 2008 total was down 46.4 percent from the
October 2007 figure, and diesel fuel imports had dropped to their lowest
242. Id.
243. Geoff Dyer, Beijing Continues to Defy Downturn, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 12, 2008, at 8.
244. Jonathan Cheng, Buyers'or Sellers'Market?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at C9.
245. Andrew Batson, China's Factories, Led by Steel, Slow to a Crawl, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008,
at A10. Another source has November 2007-November 2008 electrical production down only 7.8
percent. John Authers, The Short View, FN. TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2009, at 13. "This was the
sharpest decline on record." Id.
246. Patti Waldmeir, China in Push to Prop Up Local Carmakers, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 6,
2009, at 16. General Motors' flagship passenger-vehicle joint-venture (Shanghai General Motors
Corp.) during 2008 underwent its first sales decline, falling seven percent in the number of units sold
from the number sold in 2007. Patricia Jiayi Ho & Northiko Shirouzu, GM's China Sales Slow Sharply,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2009, at B2. While financing challenges might obtrude in various sectors
of their economy, the Chinese pay for automobiles in cash. Lauren R. Rubin, Hang on Tight!,
BARRON'S, Jan. 12, 2009, at 22, 33 (quoting Fred Hickey).
247. Any reading beneath 50 signifies a manufacturing contraction. Michael Dwyer, India, China,
Try to Prevent Spread of Crisis, DAtLY REP. (Atlanta), Nov. 4, 2008, at 6.
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248monthly level in over a year.
November 2008 figures revealed a big slowdown in tax revenues.24 9
In November 2008, China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines,
two of her three largest state-run carriers, had petitioned for emergency
governmental subsidies. All three carriers had lost money in the third
quarter of 2008, China Eastern absorbing a record such loss (a contrast with
its profit in the third quarter of 2007).21 Upwards of two-thirds of China's
toymakers closed their doors in 2008.25P Japanese exports to China
dropped .9 percent in October 2008 from October 2007.252
On November 26, 2008, Shenzhen's mayor confessed that factory
closings had eliminated 50,000 jobs therein during 2008. Closed, or
ceasing production, were 682 factories.253 Between January 2008 and
January 2009 foreign direct investment in China shriveled 33 percent.254
By late 2008, widespread factory closures in southern China had ignited a
series of protests.255  Director of the Central Rural Work Leading Group
Office Chen Xiwen in February 2009 conceded that approximately 20
248. David Winning & Shai Oster, Slowdown Depresses China's Fuel Demand, WALL ST. J., Nov.
18, 2008, at A12.
249. Geoff Dyer, Beijing Offering Just Quarter of Stimulus Funds, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.
15/16, 2008, at 3.
250. Jamil Anderlini, Chinese Airlines Seek Emergency Aid, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2008, at
20. "The industry expects Air China will be next to be bailed out by Beijing." Jamil Anderlini, Beijing
More Than Doubles China Eastern Rescue Package, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 30, 2008, at 16. "At
the start of December, Okay Airlines, China's first privately owned airline, suspended all passenger
services indefinitely, stranding thousands of travelers and ending a brief and unprofitable chapter in the
country's aviation history." Jamil Anderlini, China Grapples With the Downturn: Airlines, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 31, 2008, at 12. "As the global crisis worsens and the sector prepares for more
turbulence, the outlook is increasingly bleak for the remainder of China's private and smaller carriers."
Id.
251. Geoff Dyer, Export Fall in China Raises Trade War Fears, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at 4.
Panda Electronics, maker of mobile phones and color televisions, found orders down 60 percent over
2008-2009. Kathrin Hille, Manufacturers Pin Hopes on Rural Families, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 3,
2009, at 3.
252. Japan's companies had been major suppliers of components to Chinese factories assembling
export goods. Geoff Dyer, Beijing Forecasts Grim Outlook Amid Factory Closures, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 21, 2008, at 2.
253. Shenzhen is the biggest export center in China. Geoff Dyer, Top Chinese Official Warns on
Downturn, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2008, at 4.
254. Foreign Direct Investment in China Falls 33% Amid Slowdown, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123481490311994107.html.
255. Jason Leow, China President Warns Hurdles Ahead, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,2008, at A16.
Localised disturbances are a common occurrence and these are only likely to
multiply in the months ahead. But Chinese workers focus their anger first on the
factories and bosses that fire them, with local government officials quick to adopt
an empathetic and supportive pose when disputes flare up.
Equally important, the Chinese state's ability to sniff out and suppress the stirring
of a more ambitious labour movement remains formidable.
Tom Mitchell & Patti Waldmeir, China's Workers Confront a Bleak Outlook, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 9, 2009, at 3.
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million migrant workers-nearly a sixth of the 130 million such-had lost
their jobs over recent months.2 56 This total (derived from a survey of 150
villages, extrapolated nationwide) doubled that calculated by the human
resources ministry at close of 2008.257 And those 20 million unemployed
excluded those lingering in cities after suffering redundancy or yet
obtaining some kind of stipend after becoming redundant. 258 The ranks of
the unemployed were expected to hit 25 million.259
Cobalt is viewed as a crude proxy for industrial activity, so varied are
its applications. The cobalt market's poles are China and the Congo.
Katanga province attracts foreign mining companies by the score. In 2007,
some 64 percent was processed in China. Yet Chinese industrial ferment
so precipitously slowed that cobalt demand ground to a halt in 2008.
Between March 2008 and November 2008, the cobalt import price in
eastern China fell 50 percent.
260
China's 2009 exports could decline by 20 percent.26' For China's
customs agency shocked economists by revealing that Chinese exports fell
2.2 percent between November 2007 and November 2008 (their worst
collapse since 1999, and initial decline since June 2001). Meanwhile,
imports dropped 17.9 percent through the identical span (their grandest
drop since the early 1990s). Imports had risen over 20 percent during
2007. Exports during January 2009 recorded their worst setback in over a
decade, receding 17.5 percent from January 2008. This decline pace
accelerated from the December 2.8 percent drop. China's imports
plummeted 43.1 percent, versus only a 21.3 percent December
contraction.2 62  Preliminary customs data disclosed that China's
importation of crude oil slipped 17.3 percent between October and
November 2008 (notwithstanding a slump in the price of crude oil).
2 63
256. Ian Johnson & Andrew Batson, China's Migrants See Jobless Ranks Soar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
2009, at 1; Mitchell & Waldmeir, supra note 255, at 3.
257. Mitchell & Waldmeir, supra note 255, at 3.
258. Jamil Anderlini, Data Hide Scale of China's Job Woe, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. I1, 2009, at
I.
259. Out of Work in China, Bus. WK., Feb. 16, 2009, at 12.
260. William Macnamara, Cobalt Fall Reflects Slowdown in China, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 25,
2008, at 6.
261. And each one percent retreat elicits a domestic GDP contraction of .6 percent in domestic
GDP, thanks to China's structural overexposure to exports. Frank Roche, Blight of Capital
Protectionism Will Give Rise to Dollar Crisis, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2009, at 22.
262. Geoff Dyer & Jamil Anderlini, Beijing Pledges Action as Chinese Exports Fall Further Than
Expected, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. I1, 2008, at 1; Andrew Batson, Slowdown in China Gets Worse,
Increasing Global Woes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2008, at Al; "Exports fell 2 percent year-on-year in
November, or by 10 percent if you strip out currency appreciation." The Lex Column, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 24, 2008, at 10; Geoff Dyer, Chinese Exports Suffer Biggest Slide in a Decade, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 12, 2009, at 2.
263. David Winning, China Reports Steep Decline in Oil Imports, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2008, at
A13.
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China's abrupt deceleration derived from decisions of 2007 to remove
the froth from the booming property market.264 Remember those interest
rate revisions265 of 2007?2 The slowdown started in the housing market
and spread to such related industries as cement and steel.267 So by
November 2008, the collapse of China's housing market had sliced demand
for steel. According to the China Iron & Steel Association, the industry's
average profit margin by autumn 2008 had evaporated from 7.6 percent in
the opening half of 2008 to 1.4 percent. The steel industry's 2008
downturn proved both the deepest and sharpest since, at least, the 1997-
1998 Asian financial crisis period.268 Inasmuch as China represents 50
percent of world steelmaking capacity, her steel firms will face a rough
patch in financing idle capacity. 69  In November 2008, iron ore imports
dropped 7.9 percent.270 And a large fall in orders from sectors like
construction (and automobiles, and appliance) resulted in a December 1,
2008, announcement that China would spend some $3 billion buying base
metals to cushion its mining and smelting industry from plummeting
demand.27' In February 2009, new car sales for 2009 were expected to
level or decline.272
Beijing claimed a fourth-quarter 2008 economic expansion over the
fourth quarter of 2007. But after stripping away seasonal adjustments,
some economists tentatively estimated the economy actually could have
shrunk.273 Few economists credited China's official unemployment rate of
4 percent. Economist at the Central Party School (a Communist Party
institute, in Beijing) Zhou Tianyong estimated the true jobless rate at about
264. David Pilling, Chinese Growth-the Unadulterated Version, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 13,
2008, at 11.
265. Authers, supra note 169, at 17.
266. In 2008, China reversed that 2007 interest rate course:
The Chinese central bank reduced its key one-year lending rate to 6.66 percent from
6.93 percent on Oct. 29. China cut borrowing costs for the first time in six years on
Sept. 15, the day U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for
bankruptcy. It followed up with another reduction on Oct. 8 as the Fed and five
other central banks made emergency coordinated reductions to counter the financial
crisis.
Dwyer, supra note 247, at 7.
267. Dyer, supra note 251, at 2.
268. Andrew Batson, China's Steel Industry Slows Down, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2008, at B2.
269. Leslie P. Norton, Still Seeking Firm Footing, BARRON'S, Dec. 15, 2008, at M7.
270. Batson, supra note 268, at A13.
271. Patti Waldmeir & Javier Bias, China Buys $3 bn. of Base Metals to Protect Sector, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 2, 2008, at 22.
272. Patti Waldmeir & John Reed, China Used-Car Dealers in Top Gear, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 5, 2009, at 6.
273. Geoff Dyer, Economists Treat Statistics from Beijing with Caution, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
23, 2009, at 3. "The official figures for house prices are believed by some to understate both past
increases and current decreases in prices." Id.
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12 percent, rising to 14 percent in 2009.274 Of China's 5.6 million 2008
university graduates, 1.5 million had not been able to find jobs by early
2009.275
Australia's central bank Governor Glenn Stevens in December 2008
opined: "The most striking real economic fact of the past several months is
not continued US economic weakness, but that China's economy has
slowed much more quickly than anyone had forecast., 276 In January 2009,
the price of goods departing factories dropped 3.3 percent, probably toS • 277
depress corporate profits (a crucial investment source in China). The
retreat of China's manufacturing output put a quietus to the theory of
economic global decoupling. Finance professor at Guanghua School,
Peking University, Michael Pettis explained that developing nations'
dependence on American demand was obvious from world balance of
payments data: U.S. trade deficits and the developing lands' trade surpluses
rose as proportion of global G.D.P. in a nearly unbroken line between 1997
and 2007. The world balance of payments could be restored via sharp
decline in global production: ending overcapacity via stupefying factory
bankruptcies.278 Given political realities, the Asian trade surplus countries'
production looked destined to contract, painfully.
279
However, in the winter of 2009, there appeared but little Beijing
policymakers might attempt short-term without evoking an export sector
collapse, and an unemployment hike threatening social stability. China
must take years to adjust, demanding substantial change in her financial
system.28° Citibank economist Ken Peng perceived that the People's
Republic's 2008 production growth slowdown proved even more abrupt
than that of the fateful Asian financial crisis of the 1990S.281 And a
behemoth Chinese stock market clifftop leap prepares a 2010 test of
Beijing's ability to finally achieve What her twentieth-century neighbors
could not achieve: Developed nation status devoid of the rule of law.
274. Batson, supra note 268, at AI3.
275. Minxin Pei, How Beijing Can Boost Its Human Capital, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 2009, at
9.
276. Batson, supra note 268, at A13.
277. Geoff Dyer, China Faces Consumer Price Deflation, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 2009, at 6.
278. Michael Pettis, Asia Faces a Tough 2009 as Output Decreases, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 15,
2009, at 11. Or did the retreat of Chinese manufacturing output smother the theory of global
decoupling? See, e.g., Andrew Wood, Renewed Strength in Chinese Equities Revives Decoupling Talk,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 2009, at 25.
279. Pettis, supra note 278, at 11.
280. Michael Pettis, This Is Not the Time to Attack China, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2009, at
11.
281. Geoff Dyer, China's Output Growth at Lowest in 7 Years, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 14,
2008, at 3.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion briefly has reviewed the field of political
economy as overlapping economics, politics, and law. Debate over
political reforms in the People's Republic of China must distinguish the
rule of law from democracy. To a large extent, it is the shield of the law
(as distinct from democracy) which elicits investor confidence because
investor rights are respected. Soros Fund Management Chairman George
Soros made plain as much in a 2008 interview with Judy Woodruff:
Woodruff: So while people are thinking that goods are cheaper from
China, you're saying the prices go up. It affects so many things that we
buy in this country. What of Russia and how its economy is doing?
Soros: Basically, the country is benefiting from the high price of oil,
but, at the same time, it is reestablishing a very authoritarian regime
where the rights of investors are not respected. Now it is British
Petroleum that is being chased out. So you invest at your own risk.
I've done it and I'm not going to do it again.
Woodruff: So what you see in Russia tells us that political freedom
and economic freedom are separable after all?
Soros: Well, the lack of political freedom also impinges on the rights of
shareholders. So it's not a suitable area for investing exactly because
you don't have the rule of law. China is improving a great deal. The
rule of law is getting stronger in China, even though you don't have
democracy.
283
Political economy helps to instill the lesson that the rule of law
(Soros: "even though you don't have democracy") enriches the
environment for countrywide economic development.
Police state284 Communist China's mindboggling boom of 1978-2008
282. See, e.g., DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW vS. DEMOCRATIZATION
(Suisheng Zhao ed., 2006).
283. The Financial Crisis: An Interview with George Soros, N.Y. REV. BKS., May 15, 2008, at 8, 10
(interview of April 4, 2008, with Judy Woodruff of Bloomberg TV).
284. See, e.g., KANG ZHENGGUO, CONFUSIONS: AN INNOCENT LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (2008).
The long widely-respected CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, David L. Edwards, Christian Science, in
THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 100 (Alan Bullock & Oliver Stallybrass eds., 1997),
published the dialogue How to Stop Illegal News Coverage appearing in a training manual distributed to
Beijing police officers learning English in preparing for the 2008 Olympic Games. Peter Ford, China to
Relax Press Limits Ahead of 2008 Games: But a Police Training Manual Teaches English Phrases
Needed to Detain Foreigners for Reporting on Falun Gong, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 4, 2006,
available at www.csmonitor.com/2006/1204/p06s02-woap.html. According to N.Y.U. Remarque
Institute Director Tony Judi: "Modem secular society has long been uncomfortable with the idea of
'evil.' We prefer more rationalistic and legal definitions of good and bad, right and wrong, crime and
punishment." Tony Judt, The 'Problem of Evil' in Postwar Europe, N.Y. REV. BKs., Feb. 14, 2008, at
33, 34. Naturally, Roman Catholic thinkers (e.g., assessing China) have not shared the squeamishness
of their sistem and brethren. Id. at 34 n.5.
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seemed to prove the rule of law to be optional to national development.
The Asian economies since 1960 have outpaced in growth those of the
west.285  First emerged Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. 286  Erupting
thereafter were the People's Republic of China and, less effervescently,
India.287 However, Beijing has yet to snatch the trophy of developed nation
status. Similar longterm booms in East Asia of over a decade ago
foundered on the shoals of financial crisis. It was speculated whether the
Wall Street Crash climaxing in March 2009 would prove the catalyst for a
Chinese meltdown devastating China's economy. 218  China's 2008-2009
downturn definitely marked her most serious one since 1989.289 It was
speculated whether the 2008-2009 downturn could light the fuse for the
blowup of the Chinese Communist tyranny.29°
The year 2009 marked a juncture wherein China had the chance to
enhance the rule of law internally, and so to advance to developed nation
status along that thoroughfare. Too, in 2010 China will have the chance to
prove itself a fit partner of neighbor lands globally, above all, of her valiant
little sister Taiwan.29 1 Beijing can do so by embracing the rules and norms
of nondiscrimination and market openness, and a system of rules and
institutions. The latter endeavor could redound to the profit, and enhanced
military security, of the human race. Even so much is in play.
285. According to the University of Oxford's Alan Ryan. Alan Ryan, What Happened to the
American Empire?, N.Y. REV. BKS., Oct. 23, 2008, at 59, 62.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. William Pesek, Wall Street Crash Could Be Catalyst for Chinese Meltdown, DAILY REP., Oct.
6, 2008, at 6.
289. Johnson & Batson, supra note 256, at A10.
290. "China's fiscal bailout contains lots of smoke and mirrors, and social unrest is mounting. We
may be seeing the final days of the Mao dynasty." A. Gary Schilling, Field Day for Short-Sellers,
FORBES, Feb. 16, 2009, at 106.
China is best viewed as a paradox. Seen from western capitals, it often appears
bathed in a glow of enviable destiny-the future superpower with supercharged
growth. But from within Zhongnanhai, the forbidden compound in central Beijing
where its leaders live and work, the country feels besieged by a perennial
employment crisis, the social injustice of a vast wealth gap, restive ethnic minorities
and a deep imbalance between the rigidity of Communist rule and the flexibility
required by a capitalist economy.
The west may be looking to China as a source of growth, but Beijing is feeling
defensive: concerned above all else to ensure that a sharp slump in growth does not
trigger regime-threatening unrest. All Chinese policies can almost always be traced
back to this primal fear.
Editorial, Chinese Leadership Besieged by Caution, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 3, 2009, at 10.
291. See, e.g., Patrick Smith, Taiwan and China Dance Ever Closer: To Further Economic
Integration, Beijing and Taipei May Table the Issue of the Island's Sovereignty, BUS. WK., Nov. 10,
2008, at 58. Meanwhile, official data discloses that Taiwan's GDP shriveled 8.86 percent between the
final quarter of 2007 and the final quarter of 2008. Taiwan's economy contracting for two consecutive
quarters, it glided into recession. This especially spelled gloom for China, wherein Taiwanese
manufacturers have relocated much of their ofutput. Robin Kwong, Tumbling GDP Pushes Taiwan into
Recession, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 2009, at 2.
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